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Child sex ratios have been falling in recent decades in India, leading to an increasing 
number of missing girls. Although the country as a whole is becoming more imbalanced, 
in almost a quarter of districts the child sex ratio began to equalize between 2001 and 
2011. This analysis explores the trends, composition, and drivers of the equalizing child 
sex ratios. Procedures and Methods: In the first paper, I test for evidence that the 
equalization in child sex ratios is associated with how imbalanced the sex ratio had been 
previously, at a district-level using fixed effects models. In the second paper, I 
decompose the equalization in child sex ratio into equalization in the sex ratio at birth 
(relating to pre-birth events) and reductions in excess female child mortality. I 
decompose districts by rural and urban populations and then explore the decomposition 
pattern by geographic clusters. In the third paper, I test various drivers of the equalization 
using individual level data and regression models. Specifically, I look at factors related to 
the marriage and labor market, changing social norms, and access to sex-selective 
technology. Results: The equalization in child sex ratios is associated with how 
imbalanced the sex ratio was in previous decades, controlling for other district-level 
socio-economic factors. Pre-birth events make up the majority of cause of imbalanced 
sex ratios, and though the magnitudes have gone down over time, the relative 
contribution from pre-birth events and mortality has remained the same. No substantial 
differences in the decomposition exist between rural and urban areas and based on 
geographic clusters. Finally, women’s labor force opportunities, both at the individual 
and community-level, are associated with the probability of a family having a boy and the 
community-level child sex ratio. Conclusions: Equalization in child sex ratios in Indian 
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districts is related to the imbalance of the sex ratios in the past and female labor force 
opportunities. Most of the imbalance is due to pre-birth events rather than excess female 
child mortality, and a reduction in pre-birth events are also responsible for the majority of 
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Child sex ratios (the number of girls under five divided by the number of boys under five) 
in India have shown an increased girl deficit in the past few decades.  The 2011 census 
showed the child sex ratios were more imbalanced than ever in recorded history, with 914 
girls for every 1000 boys under the age of five nation-wide, down from 927/1000 in 2001 
(Jha et al., 2011). India, especially in the north, has a long history of son preference, due 
to social, economic, and religious reasons (Arnold et al., 1998). Son preference has 
driven families to not want, and therefore discriminate against, girls, which has taken the 
forms of neglect and infanticide historically, and sex-selective abortion in more recent 
years, especially as desired family size has declined (Guilmoto, 2008).  
 
Despite the overall national trend in child sex ratios becoming more imbalanced, child 
sex ratios in almost 25% of districts in India began to equalize between 2001 and 2011. 
There has been very little attention paid to these districts, or why or how their child sex 
ratios are showing equalization. Recent analysis by Diamond-Smith and Bishai (2012) 
suggested that at a state level, an extremely imbalanced child sex ratio at one time point 
was associated with an equalized child sex ratio at the later time point (10 years apart 
using the census data) (Diamond-Smith and Bishai, 2012). Extremely or very 
imbalanced, in this case, means child sex ratios that are far below the average child sex 
ratio in India, generally below 800/1000. This suggests that something about an 
extremely imbalanced sex ratio is leading to self-correction in some states in India.  This 
intriguing finding deserves exploration in more detail at a district-level. India’s current 
population is over 1.2 billion, with 35 states and territories and over 600 districts. 
Districts range in population from 7,948 (Dibang Valley, Andhra Pradesh) to over 11 
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million (Thane, Maharashtra), with over 70% of districts having more than a million 
people (Registrar General of India, 2011).  Examining district-level trends in India is 
essential due to India’s large population, geographic size, and socio-cultural diversity. 
 
Imbalanced child sex ratios are made up of two components: pre-birth events (measured 
by the sex ratio at birth) and excess mortality for girl children. Evidence suggests that the 
current imbalance is due predominantly to pre-birth events, usually accepted to be sex-
selective abortion that has become much more widely available and affordable in recent 
decades (Jha et al., 2011, Retherford and Roy, 2003). Before the creation and 
proliferation of sex-selective technology, child sex ratios were imbalanced due to excess 
female mortality because (among other reasons) girls were fed less, breastfed for a 
shorter duration, taken to health facilities less frequently when sick, and were less likely 
to be fully immunized (Arnold et al., 1998, Mishra et al., 2004, Barcellos et al., 2012). 
The equalization in child sex ratio seen between 2001 and 2011 could be due to either 
reductions in pre-birth events (sex-selective abortions) or improved girl child mortality 
relative to boys.  
 
If indeed something happens when child sex ratios become very deficient in girls that 
changes behavior and makes child sex ratios equalize, it is essential to understand what 
this might be. There are a number of possible outcomes of very unequal sex ratios that 
could have social consequences and which would subsequently change people’s 
preferences for girls or boys. Some possible drivers of a reversal are tensions due to lack 
of females in the marriage market or to fulfill female specific occupations (improved 
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labor market for women), changing social norms, and reductions in access to sex-
selective technology because of effective programs and enforcement of laws.   
 
The first paper in this series (Chapter 2) uses fixed effects models to test whether there is 
evidence that the child sex ratio at one point in time is associated with the change in child 
sex ratio at the next point in time, using census data from four censuses (1981, 1991, 
2001, and 2011). The aim is to determine whether a very unequal sex ratio at one census 
is a predictor of equalization in the child sex ratio in the next census. This would provide 
evidence that equalization could be a reaction to having a very unequal sex ratio.   In this 
paper, I control for various potentially confounding factors such as the fertility rate, 
infant mortality rate, female literacy rate, the percent of the population that is of lower 
caste or tribal population, and the percent of the district that is urban versus rural.  
 
Controlling for these other factors, the level of the child sex ratio in one period is 
associated with the change in child sex ratio in the next time point, specifically, the more 
imbalanced a sex ratio was in the earlier time period, the greater the positive change 
(equalization) in the next time period. Fertility rate, female literacy, total literacy rate, 
and the percent of the population that are Scheduled Tribe were significantly associated 
with the change in child sex ratio between two censuses. This suggests that something 
happens when the child sex ratio falls to a low level that causes people to stop 
discriminating against girls as much.    
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The second paper in this series focuses in on the districts that have shown signs of 
equalization in their child sex ratios between 2001 and 2011, primarily using census data 
and additional demographic estimation techniques. As mentioned above, the child sex 
ratio is made up of two components: the sex ratio at birth, which is driven by pre-birth 
events (fertility related, most likely due to sex-selective abortion), and the sex ratio 
between birth and age five, which is driven by differentials in mortality rates for boys and 
girls (mortality related). I decompose the child sex ratio in 2001 and 2011, and the 
change between the two census years, into fertility and mortality components. Since there 
are no data on the sex ratio at birth for both the 2001 and 2011 censuses, I reverse-survive 
the child population of boys and girls using life tables to estimate the sex ratio at birth at 
a district-level at each time point. I then evaluate if the equalization in child sex ratios is 
mostly due to events before or after birth. I then decompose the child sex ratio in rural 
and urban areas of each district to test if there are differences between these populations. 
I also explore the decomposition by regional clusters of districts where child sex ratios 
are equalizing.  
 
Pre-birth events make up the majority (93-4%) of missing girls in the imbalanced sex 
ratio at both time points. The relative contribution of pre-birth events and mortality to the 
imbalanced sex ratio remained stable between 2001 and 2011. Reductions in pre-birth 
events are the main contributor (in terms of magnitude) to the equalization in child sex 
ratio.  Pre-birth events make up the majority of the cause of imbalanced sex ratios and 
reason for equalization in both rural and urban areas. Interestingly, there is evidence that 
in urban areas child mortality is contributing more to the imbalanced sex ratio in 2011 
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compared to 2001, suggesting that improvements in girl child mortality compared to boy 
child mortality may have decreased or stagnated.  Four main geographical clusters of 
equalizing districts emerged when the equalizing districts were mapped: in the north 
around Delhi, Chandigarh, Punjab. and Haryana; the west around the capital of Gujarat, 
Ahmedabad; the south stretching in a narrow line from Tamil Nadu up through 
Karnataka; and many scattered districts in the northeastern region. Child sex ratios were 
much lower in the north and west clusters than in the south and northeastern clusters. 
However, the decomposed contribution to the child sex ratio did not differ substantially 
by cluster.  
 
Various supply and demand side factors could act as motivating forces for the 
equalization of child sex ratios. On the demand-side, changing desires for girls or boys 
due to tensions in the marriage market (because of a shortage of girls), improvements in 
women’s labor force opportunities (because a shortage of girls in the labor market leads 
to as increase in female labor opportunities), or shifting social norms could be changing 
preferences. From the supply-side, reductions in access to sex-selective technology, 
perhaps due to better regulation, could be restricting people’s access to sex-selective 
abortions. The third paper moves from the population to the individual-level, using 
household-level data to explore different potential drivers for equalized child sex ratios. I 
test the marriage and labor market, as well as social norm-related variables and supply-
side variables, on an individual’s probability of having a boy, and on the community-




Labor supply opportunities for women at an individual and at a community-level (percent 
of women in the labor force) stand out as predictors for both an individual woman’s odds 
of having a boy, and the community-level child sex ratio. Interestingly, any labor force 
participation was associated with increased odds of having a boy, whereas labor force 
participation/opportunities in professional occupations had the opposite effect, equalizing 
child sex ratios and decreasing the odds of having a boy. There was some evidence that 
supply variables relating to access to doctors were associated with having a boy, 
however, marriage and norm variables were not for the most part significantly associated 
with either outcome.  
 
These three papers build upon each other to paint a fuller picture of the recent 
phenomenon of equalizing child sex ratios in India. First, I show that there is evidence 
that larger pro-girl increments in the sex ratio in 2011 occurred in areas where the sex-
ratio was least pro-girl in 2001, controlling for other demographic factors. I then delve 
deeper into the districts that have become more equal to understand the contribution from 
excess female mortality and pre-birth events to the child sex ratio via decomposition, and 
explore whether there are geographic patterns, and if the increase is occurring in both 
rural and urban areas within districts. Finally, I test potential demand and supply-side 
drivers of the equalization at an individual-level to see if variables relating to the 
marriage market, labor market, norms, or access to technology are associated with 
people’s probability of having a boy and the community-level child sex ratio. In 
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summary, I explore if the trend in equalizing child sex ratios is real, dissect the trend into 
components, and then test potential drivers of the trend.  
 
Taken together, these three papers give insight into the nascent trend of equalizing child 
sex ratios, which has yet to be explored at all in depth. It provides hope that the 
increasing imbalance in child sex ratios in recent decades in India will not continue 
forever, and may begin to slow and reverse in other regions as well. Where occurring, the 
equalization appears to be deep rooted (both in rural and urban areas), and might spread 
from the current epicenters to the rest of the country as other social and demographic 
trends have in the past. People are either making a conscious choice not to abort female 
fetuses as frequently, or access to sex-selective technology has been restricted effectively, 
both of which provide promise for future behavior change or the possibility of effective 
regulation (which to date has been mostly unsuccessful).   More research on the drivers of 
the equalization is necessary, especially the relationship between more opportunities for 
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PAPER 1:  
 
EVIDENCE OF SELF-CORRECTION OF CHILD SEX RATIOS IN INDIA:  




“500 rupees today to save 50,000 rupees tomorrow”  
(Advertisement on ultrasound clinics suggesting that families pay for an ultrasound and 
abortion today (if it’s a girl) rather than a more expensive dowry in the future) 







Sex ratios in India have become increasingly imbalanced over the past decades. I 
hypothesize that when sex ratios become very uneven, the shortage of girls will increase 
girls' future value leading sex ratios to self-correct. Using data on children under five 
from the last four Indian censuses I examine the relationship between the sex ratio at one 
point in time and the change in sex ratio over the next ten years by district. Indian 
districts with imbalanced sex ratios became even more unequal between 1991 and 2001. 
However, analysis shows that districts with the most imbalanced sex ratios in 2001 had 
larger corrections by 2011. Fixed effects models show that, accounting for unobserved 
district-level characteristics, sex ratios are now significantly negatively correlated with 
the change in sex ratio in the successive ten-year period. This suggests that self-corrective 





Uneven sex ratios at birth and throughout childhood have been noted for decades in 
India, where the ratio is imbalanced in favor of boys (Jha et al., 2011). This is 
hypothesized to be due to a strong cultural preference for sons, combined with access to 
sex-selective technologies and a falling fertility rate (Guilmoto, 2009). In India as a 
whole in 2011 there were 914 girls for every 1000 boys under six years old, compared to 
927/1000 in 2001 and 945/1000 in 1991(Jha et al., 2011). Most of the increase in 
imbalance is thought to be due to increases in sex-selective abortion, rather than excess 
mortality for girls, although both contribute to the imbalance in children under six (Jha et 
al., 2011). Desired sex ratios (as reported by individuals) in India are even higher than 
actual sex ratios in most states, suggesting that with increased access to sex-selective 
technologies in the future, it is possible sex ratios will become even more imbalanced 
(Bongaarts, 2013).  
 
Much media and scholarly attention over the past few years has been paid to the 
increasingly imbalanced sex ratios in India, which may have dire consequences for 
marriage patterns, social stability, violence, and mental health in the future (Guilmoto, 
2012, Hesketh, 2011). Scholars have suggested that there will be 40 million men 
remaining single between 2020-2080 in India (Guilmoto, 2012).  Men spending longer 
periods outside of unions may increase their exposure to sex with prostitutes posing the 
threat of an increase of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS, as has been seen in 
China (Tucker et al., 2006). Additionally, evidence from China has suggested that a more 
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imbalanced sex ratio (by 0.01) increased violent and property crimes by 5-6% (Edlund et 
al., 2007). Research in India has found a relationship between sex ratios, violence, and 
homicide rates (as a whole, not only against women) (Hudson and Den Boer, 2002). 
These authors also suggested that men who are unmarried are more likely to join military 
groups, which could lead to increases in domestic or regional violence. Other research 
has suggested uneven sex ratios could increase sex trafficking (Hesketh and Xing, 2006). 
These studies do not prove causality, but they do suggest that there may be negative 
social outcomes related to imbalanced sex ratios.  
 
Increasingly imbalanced sex ratios are not sustainable in the long term at a population 
level because of biological, social, and economic factors, and we would expect that at 
some point population-level sex ratios would begin to self-correct, perhaps due to social 
forces such as the labor or marriage market. Recent research on the 2011 census has 
noted that the child sex ratio in three states appeared to have equalized slightly, although 
the country as a whole has become more imbalanced (Navaneetham and Dharmalingam, 
2011). But no research to date has looked at this phenomenon in more detail, or at a 
district-level. This paper explores the changing pattern of Indian sex ratios at a district-
level, controlling for other social and demographic factors.  
 
I. Biological Perspective 
 
Some non-human species have the ability to shift their sex ratio in response to ecological 
factors that favor imbalance. The rationale, as advanced by Trivers and Willard (1973) is 
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that in many species males born in good ecological conditions will out-reproduce females   
because strong males in times of plenty can produce offspring at a higher frequency. In 
poor ecological conditions, the females will out reproduce males (Trivers and Willard, 
1973).  From the evolutionary perspective of the mother, it is therefore advantageous to 
have sons in good times, and daughters when times are bad. This theory—the Trivers-
Willard Hypothesis—has been shown to hold for population-wide stresses due to 
environmental conditions, but to be mediated by individual specific factors due to an 
animal’s position in a social hierarchy. For example, the Seychelles warbler has a higher 
proportion of female offspring during good ecological conditions being born to higher 
ranking females, while more male offspring are born during bad conditions or to less well 
established females (Komdeur, 2002 , Komdeur et al., 1997). Higher ranking red deer 
have been shown to produce more male than female offspring (Clutton-Brock et al., 
1984).  
 
In human populations, there is evidence of a biological mechanism through which sex 
ratios are affected by stresses. The “natural” sex ratio at birth (meaning the sex ratio in a 
population that is not using sex-selective technologies to alter its sex ratio or is not 
experiencing environmental stresses) is estimated at around 105 males born for every 100 
females (Dyson, 2012).1 There is evidence that stresses that the mother experiences while 
the fetus is in utero, such as terrorism, extreme temperatures, and economic instability, 
can lead to the spontaneous abortion of male fetuses and thus alter the sex ratio at birth 
                                                        
1 Note: The literature on sex ratios conventionally uses a ratio of the number of boys over 
the number of girls, however, the discussion of sex ratios in India uses the reverse (the 
ratio of number of girls over the number of boys). For the purposes of this paper I use the 
same standard as is customarily used for India (girls/boys), unless otherwise specified. 
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(Catalano et al., 2008, Catalano et al., 2006, Catalano, 2003). Conversely, sex ratios after 
wars have at times been noted to favor males (James, 2009). Research into the life 
expectancies of males born in Sweden in cold years, when the sex ratio favored females, 
showed that those males who were born lived longer than males born in normal years, 
suggesting that pregnant women abort weaker male fetuses in times of stress (Catalano et 
al., 2008).  
 
As mentioned above, on average, the sex ratio at birth in humans is estimated to be about 
105 boys for every 100 girls.  However, male neonates and infants have higher mortality 
than females. For example, diarrheal disease, tuberculosis, measles, diphtheria, 
pneumonia, syphilis, respiratory distress syndrome, and sudden infant death syndrome all 
show higher mortality in the post-natal period for males compared to females (Wells, 
2000). Overall, male infants show a higher propensity to become malnourished, and are 
less robust in general (Wells, 2000). Wells (2000) suggests that rather than looking at the 
Trivers-Willard hypothesis in the narrow constraints of pregnancy, we should think about 
the whole period of parental investment (which he defines as through the end of 
breastfeeding) as a time when parents could be adjusting their sex ratio based on 
environmental conditions and information about the strength of the infant (Wells, 2000).  
Hence, he argues that the weakness of male infants is a method by which natural 
selection has allowed parents to be able to prolong the period for deciding whether to 
invest in a certain infant. If times are bad, and it would be disadvantageous to have a 
male, the weaker male infants will be more at risk to disease and death, thereby 
conserving maternal fitness, and allowing the mother to have another pregnancy sooner.  
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II. Social and Cultural Perspective  
 
In much of Asia, son preference is thought to be a manifestation of patrilineal social 
structures that favor males and generally create situations in which boys are a better 
investment than girls (Das Gupta, 2009). As in most agrarian societies, in rural India, 
sons traditionally have been a better investment because they work on the farms using the 
male advantage in aggression to protect rural property and other assets from theft. 
Agrarian sons, thus, can produce more income than daughters and provide security and 
support in old age (Arnold et al., 1998). Another stated cause of son preference 
(especially for Hindus in India) is the religious role that sons play in funeral ceremonies 
(Arnold et al., 1998).  Modernization and a reduction in the threat of violence may have 
reduced the gendered physical advantages underlying income disparities, but culture and 
tradition can sustain son preference long after the economic rationale has declined. 
 
Social factors are sometimes intertwined with the economic factors that lead to son 
preference. Where the kinship system is patrilineal, girls drain family resources because 
they require inputs (food, health care, dowry) and once they marry they no longer 
contribute (in terms of care or money) to the household, while boys remain with their 
families and contribute for the remainder of their lives (Chakraborty and Kim, 2012). 
Therefore, in the Indian context, it is not just that families prefer boys, but there are also 
disincentives to having girls.  Past qualitative research in southern India showed that 
women are well aware of the economic benefit of boys, and that families are actually 
averse to having girls, due to the costs of marriage. However, girls do provide other 
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important benefits in terms of emotional support and care. As one respondent described 
“Two boys and one girl is enough because two boys will support themselves, and the girl 
will be more useful to me. When I am old with problems, she will come to help me.” 
p.702 (Diamond-Smith et al., 2008).  
 
Since Amartya Sen first described 100 million missing women in Asia in the 1990s, 
much attention has focused on understanding the causes, consequences, and magnitude of 
son preference and daughter discrimination (Sen, 1990). Since Sen’s publication other 
authors have tried to estimate the number of missing women in India at various time 
periods.  Research in the 1990s suggested that over one million girls were “missing” due 
to sex-selective abortion and female infanticide between 1981 and 1991 (Das Gupta and 
Bhat, 1997). Recently, Anderson and Ray (2012) estimated that a total of over two 
million women are missing in India in a given year, with 12% missing at birth, 25% 
missing in childhood, 18% in reproductive ages and 45% in older ages (Anderson and 
Ray, 2012). Another way to think about this is that of the women who could be alive 
today, 25 million are missing (Anderson and Ray, 2012). Other work suggests that 
virtually all of the gender imbalance in India is due to excess mortality under the age of 
five, and mostly between ages two to five years (Oster, 2009). Given the lack of 
conclusive evidence about whether the sex ratio imbalance is due predominantly to sex-
selective abortion or to excess mortality, this paper will look at the sex ratio in children 




III. Excess mortality for girl children 
 
There are many ways that son preference can be expressed. It can be expressed in uneven 
investment in children by gender, for example, sending boys to school longer than girls, 
seeking health care for boys sooner than girls, and/or giving boys better nutrition than 
girls (Arnold et al., 1998, Mishra et al., 2004). These practices can be described as 
discrimination against girls, some types of which can lead to excess mortality for girls, 
and subsequent uneven sex ratios post-birth.  
 
Mortality for girls in childhood exceeded mortality for boys in childhood by 43% in India 
in the 1990s (Arnold et al., 1998). This excess mortality was due to discrimination 
against girls in terms of food allocation, nutritional level, care-seeking behavior when the 
child is ill, and preventative services (vaccinations, etc.) (Mishra et al., 2004). Sons have 
also been shown to be breastfed longer, receive more vitamin supplements, partially due 
to the fact that girls more often end up in larger families (Barcellos et al., 2012). Oster 
(2009) looked at the impact of specific types of biases on mortality, and found that 
uneven vaccination rates explain about 20-30% of the sex imbalance, malnutrition 
explains 20%, respiratory infections and diarrhea combined explain 5%, and the 
remaining roughly 50% is unexplained by these factors (Oster, 2009).  
 
As mentioned above, in populations without gender preference, male infants have higher 
rates of mortality than female infants in general, especially in the neonatal period (Wells, 
2000). Hill and Upchurch (1995) used Demographic and Health Survey data from around 
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the world to look at gender differences in child mortality. With development, mortality in 
the neonatal period generally declines, most of which is due to infectious diseases 
initially which disproportionally affects males. Hence, the female advantage in the 
neonatal/infant period may decline with the changing cause of death structure (Hill and 
Upchurch, 1995). Therefore, even in the absence of gender preference and uneven care-
giving practices, with development, we would expect the relative situation for girls to 
appear to decline.    
 
Sex ratios at a family level were manipulated (and continue to be today) through 
“stopping rules.” (Jha et al., 2011) “Stopping rules” is the concept that a family continues 
having children until they have reached some goal (such as having one son), and then 
they stop childbearing (Andersson et al., 2006). As was put eloquently by a woman in 
northern India, "I myself would like one son. And I don't want many children. But it isn't 
a question of what I want. Until I have a son, I won't stop having children" p.96 (Jeffery 
and Jeffery, 1996).  In the absence of sex-selective technologies, stopping rules lead to 
more girls in a family than boys, which further impoverishes girls, as they are more often 
in larger households competing for household resources. In India, girls with older sisters 
have been shown to have the highest risk of mortality (Arnold et al., 1998).  
 
IV. Uneven sex ratios at birth 
 
As people are choosing to have fewer children, they are more pressured (squeezed) to 
have the gender of children they want in a narrower window (Guilmoto, 2009). Fertility 
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has been declining rapidly in India, heightening son preference because families are more 
pressured to have their desired number of sons as soon as possible (Basu, 1999). Sex-
selective abortion is technically illegal in India since 1994, although abortion itself has 
been legal since the 1970s (Naqvi and Kumar, 2012). There has been a proliferation of 
mobile ultrasound clinics, which offer (and even advertise aggressively) a relatively 
inexpensive way of finding out the sex of a fetus (Retherford and Roy, 2003). Once the 
sex has been determined, people have little trouble obtaining an abortion under the 
pretense of other reasons.  
 
Some authors have argued that access to pre-natal sex determination and abortion should 
allow those girls that are born to be more “wanted” and therefore excess girl-child 
mortality would decrease with increasing sex-selective abortion. Evidence of this effect 
has been found by some authors in India (Sudha and Rajan, 2003). Others have argued 
that sex-selective abortion and girl-child neglect are additive, or even re-enforce and 
strengthen each other, and that additivity has lead to further imbalanced sex ratios in parts 
of Asia in recent years (Goodkind, 1996). More research is needed to understand this 
relationship.  
 
Recent work by Roy and Chattopadhyay (2012) projected the likely sex ratio at birth in 
India given historical trends in fertility decline and sex-selective behavior by parity, and 
future projections about fertility decline. Their median projection of the peak sex ratio at 
birth for 2021-2026 (which is when fertility is projected to fall to replacement level in 
India) is 117 boys/100 girls (which is about 85.5 girls/100 boys in the reverse ratio form) 
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(Roy and Chattopadhyay, 2012). Much of this imbalance is due to son preference and sex 
selection in a select group of states mostly in northwest India. If son preference and sex 
selection spreads increasingly to other parts of the country where it is currently lower, 
such as the southeast, the authors estimate that the peak sex ratio at birth could be closer 
to 124 boys/100 girls (about 81 girls/100 boys). Perhaps hearteningly, or perhaps 
dishearteningly, other research looking at the spread of imbalanced sex ratios in India has 
suggested that areas with highly imbalanced sex ratios act as epicenters, from which 
imbalance spills outwards over time. However, the opposite is also true: where areas of 
relative equality affect their surrounding areas to lower imbalanced over time 
(Kuzhiparambil and Rajani, 2012).  
 
V. Theory of sex ratio self-correction  
 
From a biological perspective, there are limits to the number of generations a Trivers-
Willard gender imbalance can be sustained at a population level. Eventually the scarcity 
of the rarer gender makes offspring of the superfluous gender a less rewarding 
reproductive strategy.  Fisher’s principle predicts long-term failure for any mutant 
attempting reproductive success by consistently producing more male or female progeny  
(Fischer, 1930). Over the long run most species oscillate around a stable gender balance 
that is remarkably close to 1:1 (Fischer, 1930).  In human populations, cognitive 
mechanisms and social signaling could potentially recognize that one gender is in 
shortage and hence more valuable in terms of future wages and reproductive potential. 
Human populations that achieve surplus boys using stopping rules, sex-selective abortion, 
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and differential child treatment can make choices to reduce these practices on the margin 
when they recognize an increased value of girls due to shortage. However, so far, there 
has been little evidence to suggest that human populations self-correct their sex ratios in 
response to marked imbalance (Judson, 1994 , Tuljapurkar et al., 1995).  
 
This paper uses census data from 1981 to 2011 to check for self-correction by examining 
the correlation between sex ratios in Indian districts to the subsequent change in sex 
ratios over the next ten years. I hypothesize that populations with more imbalanced sex 
ratios will see proportionately greater corrective change in the subsequent sex ratios, 
compared to districts with less imbalanced sex ratios. 
 




District-level data from the 1981-2011 censuses are collected from various sources of the 
Indian Census Bureau (see Table 2.1 in Appendix 1 for data sources). Infant mortality 
rates are not yet available at a district-level for the 2011 censuses, therefore data from 
Annual Health Survey 2010 and Sample Registration System of 2010 are used for the 
major states (available at the district-level), and for non-major states, state level infant 
mortality rates from the 2011 census are used (Registrar General and Census 
Commissioner, 2012, Registrar General of India, 2011).  
 
 23 
There has been a great deal of change in district boundaries: districts have been split into 
smaller districts, and new states have been created over the last 40 years in India. 
Districts that were split into new, smaller, districts kept information about the full 
districts that they came from for the older years. For example, if a district was split into 
smaller districts in 1995, the same data from the original district in 1981 and 1991 was 
used in the model (entered twice), and then the individual data for the two new districts 
used for 2001 and 2011. In some cases, new districts were created from more than one 
former district, and in that case, the new district used information from whichever 
original district constituted the largest proportion of the new district. Much of the 
information about changing district boundaries came from Kumar and Somanathan 
(2009) (Kumar and Somanathan, 2009).   Jammu and Kashmir and Assam are dropped 
from the analysis because of civil strife that interfered with census data collection at 




The dependent variable of this analysis is the change in child sex ratio between two 
censuses (for example, between 1981 and 1991). This is calculated by subtracting the 
child sex ratio in the prior period from the child sex ratio in the later period. The main 
predictor of interest is the child sex ratio in the earlier period (in this case, periods are 10 
years between each census). The child sex ratio is the ratio of the count of living girls to 
living boys under age six in each district. Control variables (for each census year 1981-
2011) include the total fertility rate (TFR), the infant mortality rate (IMR), the percent of 
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adults in each district who were literate, the percent of female adults who were literate, 
the percent of each district that was Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, and the 
percent of each district that is rural. Scheduled Caste (SC) refers to the castes at the 
bottom of the caste hierarchy in India, and Scheduled Tribes (ST) refer to the tribal 
populations, which live mostly in the northern Indian states of Bihar, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and West Bengal, and in North-East 
Indian as well (Gang et al., 2008). SC and ST populations make up about 25% of the total 
country’s population, but almost 50% of India’s poor are in these groups (Gang et al., 
2008). Literacy rates are used as a proxy for educational status, as has been done in other 
studies in this setting (Echavarri and Ezcurra, 2010). Additionally, a time trend variable 
and an interaction term between time trend and sex ratio lagged 10 years are included. To 
account for the fact that the population of states and territories differ substantially, all 
models are weight adjusted by the mean population size of that district over the 30-year 
period.  
 
I first regress the change in sex ratio over ten years against the sex ratio ten years prior 
for each group of years (1981 to 1991; 1991 to 2001;  2001 to 2011). I then estimate a 
series of fixed effects models to account for unobservable district-level factors that I 
hypothesize do not change over time. Hausman tests are conducted that showed that a 
fixed effects model is preferable to random effects or ordinary least-squared models (chi 
squared=1108, probability>chi squared=0.000).  
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Both the regression analyses and fixed effects models are run multiple times. Models A-F 
test for robustness by adding and removing different variables. Model A includes only the 
change in sex ratio over ten years and the lagged sex ratio (10 years prior). Model B adds 
covariates for time trend and an interaction term for time trend and the sex ratio lagged 
ten years. Model C includes covariates for the total fertility rate and the infant mortality 
rate in each time period, without the time trend variables in model B. Model D includes 
variables about rural/urban percent, literacy, and SC/ST percent, again without the time 
trend variables. Model E combines both model C and D. Model F extends model E to 




Table 2.1 shows how the main covariates of interest change over time at the district-level. 
The national child sex ratio fell from 978.86 girls per 1000 boys to 921.58 girls per 1000 
boys under age six between 1981 and 2011. The total fertility rate fell from 5.12 to 2.81 
and the infant mortality rate from 116/1000 to 47/1000, a remarkable change in 30 years. 
The percent of literate adults increased more than 2 fold, from about 35% to 74%, and 
percent of female adults literate rose from 24% to 65% for women. The percent rural 
decreased over time (from 79% to 75%), and there was little change in the percent of 




Figures 1-3 show the relationship between the change in sex ratio and the sex ratio 10 
years prior. As can be seen in Figure 1, there does not seem to be much of a relationship 
between the sex ratio in 1981 and the change in sex ratio in the next period. There is 
some hint that sex ratios that were higher in 1981 became more negative in 1991, but it is 
not clear. In Figure 2 again the relationship is not quite clear, but there is some indication 
that sex ratios that were already imbalanced became even more imbalanced. In Figure 3 
there seems to be more evidence of a trend where districts that were more imbalanced in 
2001 showed positive change (became less imbalanced in 2011), whereas districts that 
were less imbalanced in 2001 became more imbalanced in 2011.  
 
 
Fig 2.1: Sex ratio change 1981-1991 versus sex ratio in 1981 
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Fig 2.2: Sex ratio change 1991-2001 versus sex ratio in 1991 
 
Fig 2.3: Sex ratio change 2001-2011 versus sex ratio in 2001 
 
I. Ordinary Least Squared Regression 
 
In the standard OLS regression (Table 2.2), there is a relationship between the outcome 
of interest (change in child sex ratio) and main predictor of interest (child sex ratio 10 
years prior), controlling for other variables, between each individual set of years. The 
association was negative between 1981 and 1991, positive between 1991 and 2001, and 
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again negative between 2001 and 2011—but all were significantly associated with p-
values <0.01. This means that the higher the sex ratio in 1981 (or 2001), the greater the 
negative change in sex ratio in the next period (1991 and 2011, respectively); however, 
the greater the sex ratio in 1991, the more positive (less imbalanced) the sex ratio became 
in 2001.  
 
The percent of literate adults was associated with increasingly imbalanced sex ratios in 
the first and last time periods, and the percent of literate female adults was associated 
with less imbalanced sex ratios in those two time periods as well (p<0.01). The more 
rural a district was in 1981 and 2001, the greater the equalization in sex ratio in 1991 and 
2011, respectively (p<0.01). The percent of a district that was SC was only associated 
with the change in sex ratio marginally between 1981 and 1991, and in this case the 
larger the percent, the less imbalanced the sex ratio became. The percent of the 
population that was ST was significantly associated with the change in sex ratio in 1981-
1991 and 1991-2001, but in different directions. The larger the percent of the population 
that was ST in 1981, the less imbalanced the sex ratio became in 1991 (p<0.01), but the 
larger the percent in 1991, the more imbalanced the sex ratio became in 2001 (p<0.05). 
The greater the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 1981, the more imbalanced the sex ratio 
became in 1991 (p<0.01), however, the greater the TFR in 1991, the less imbalanced the 
sex ratio became in 2001. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) was only associated with the 
change in sex ratio in the last time period (2001-2011), and here the higher the IMR, the 
less imbalanced the sex ratio became (p<0.01).  
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II. Fixed Effects Models 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.3, in the basic fixed effects model, the higher the sex ratio in 
the previous period, the more it declined in the next period (Model A, -0.617, p<0.01). 
This means that in districts where the sex ratio was lower, the change in sex ratio became 
less imbalanced than in districts where the sex ratio was higher, suggesting that as sex 
ratios fall, the pace of their fall lessens. In other words, a higher starting sex ratio (a less 
imbalanced sex ratio) leads to more imbalance, however, having an already imbalanced 
sex ratio leads to less imbalance in the following period. This is consistent with a 
deceleration model.  
 
This effect became stronger after the time trend variables were controlled for (Model B). 
When only TFR and IMR were controlled for (without the time trend, Model C), the 
main effect remained significant and larger than in the basic model, and an increase in 
TFR was associated with an increase in the change in sex ratio (10.115, p<0.01). In 
Model D, when percent rural, literacy, and caste were taken into account, the main effect 
remained significant and was larger than in the basic model. An increase in the percent of 
adults who were literate increased the change in child sex ratio (more imbalance) 
(p<0.01), but an increase in the percent of female adults who were literate decreased the 
change in the sex ratio (less imbalance) (p<0.01). The larger the percent of the district 
that was ST, the higher the sex ratio change (p<0.05). The percent rural and percent SC 
were not significantly associated. In Model E where all covariates except for the time 
trend variables were added, all of the above-mentioned factors remained significantly 
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associated with the sex ratio change to the same significance level and similar magnitude. 
The final model, Model F, includes all of the above-mentioned covariates, and again, all 
of the covariates that were significant remain significant in the same direction and similar 
magnitude, and with the same level of significance. This suggests that the model is robust 
and provides strong evidence that a more unbalanced sex ratio in an earlier period is 




Overall, the sex ratio in children has fallen in India over the past 30 years. This has been 
concurrent with a fall in total fertility rate (TFR) from 5.12 to 2.81 and infant mortality 
rate (IMR) from 115.7/1000 to 46.55/1000. Literacy for the population as a whole and for 
women specifically has risen over that time period. A smaller proportion of districts are 
rural, and about the same percent of the population of districts are ST and SC. All of 
these changes are in the direction expected for a rapidly developing country, although 
India does lag behind other countries, especially in female literacy rates (for example, 
China’s female literacy rate in 2007 was 88.5%) (CIA World Factbook).   
 
Our models find that, controlling for other demographic factors, districts in India that 
have historically had increasingly imbalanced sex ratios are beginning to decelerate their 
decline, and in some cases even begin to equalize in their sex ratios. This suggests that as 
sex ratios become increasingly imbalanced, people begin to adjust their behavior to not 
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discriminate against their female children as much. In other words, the situation for girls 
begins to improve as girls become increasingly scarce.   
 
I. Total Fertility Rate and Infant Mortality Rate 
 
Theoretically, a decline in TFR should accompany an increasingly imbalanced sex ratio, 
as discussed above (Guilmoto, 2009, Basu, 1999). When families have fewer children 
and son preference still exists, they are more pressured to have the desired number of 
sons in a smaller number of child “slots.” Therefore, the sex ratio in children is expected 
to become more imbalanced. In the OLS regressions, a higher TFR is associated with a 
decline in child sex ratio in the 1981-1991 period, an increase in child sex ratio in the 
1991-2001 period, and not significantly associated between 2001-2011 (although the 
direction is negative, in that a higher TFR is associated with more imbalance in child sex 
ratio). Therefore, it is expected that as TFR falls, the sex ratio should become more 
imbalanced, as was seen in 1991-2001 period. This might have been the period where 
access to and use of sex-selective technology increased greatly in the country. As 
expected, TFR is significantly associated with the change in child sex ratio in the fixed 
effects model, with a lower TFR being associated with more imbalanced sex ratios.  
 
Much literature has explored the relationship between IMR and TFR, as TFR and IMR 
often fall in similar time periods. Some literature suggests that a decline in IMR allows 
families to feel safe having fewer children (they have more assurance that some children 
will live to adulthood), and therefore precedes a decline in TFR, this is consistent with 
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the general idea of the Demographic Transition Theory (for a summary see Kirk, 1996 
(Kirk, 1996)). Other research is not as conclusive that IMR falls before TFR, and 
suggests that by having smaller sized families, parents are better able to care for and 
invest in the children they have, thereby lowering IMR (Bongaarts, 1987, Rosenzweig 
and Schultz, 1983). There is other evidence that other changes (such as improvements in 
sanitation) have an impact on both of these factors, but they themselves are not causally 




Past research has found that child sex ratios were more imbalanced in urban areas than 
rural areas (Jha et al., 2011). Although ultrasounds and abortions are available in rural 
areas, they usually start off in urban areas and move to rural areas, and therefore may be 
less accessible in rural areas (Akbulut-Yuksel and Rosenblum, 2012). Also, fertility tends 
to be lower in urban areas, thereby heightening the pressure to have sons as soon as 
possible where son preference exists (Guilmoto and Rajan, 2001). More educated and 
wealthy families (and therefore those more likely to live in urban areas) are more likely 
to have imbalanced sex ratios (Subramanian and Selvaraj, 2009). The relationship 
between rural percent and sex ratio in this study might have been subsumed under the 
other factors related to rural populations, such as TFR and literacy, which were 




III. Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste (ST/SC) 
 
There is a long history of poorer educational attainment, occupational choices and 
income, and health outcomes for ST/SC populations compared to non-ST/SC populations 
in India. For example, infants, children and the elderly from ST and SC groups had 
higher mortality than non-scheduled populations (Subramanian et al., 2006). However, 
there is recent evidence of a reduction in the gap in education and wages in recent years 
although states with larger ST populations have showed less convergence in wages and 
education compared to SC and non-scheduled populations (Hnatkovskay and Lahiri, 
forthcoming). Other work has found that the causes of poverty for ST and SC populations 
differ, with the social constrictions created by the caste system being more important for 
SC population, while “..returns to the occupational structure” are more important factors 
for ST populations (Gang et al., 2008). These findings suggest that SC and ST 
populations should not be lumped together indiscriminately.  
 
The percent of the ST population was associated with the change in child sex ratio, 
however, percent SC was not. This supports other research that scheduled castes and 
tribes are different, and should not be clumped together necessarily. More research could 
explore what differentiates ST and SC populations in terms of their preference for sons or 
use of sex-selective technologies, and why larger ST populations might be associated 




IV. Literacy and Education 
 
Extensive literature has explored and argued about the relationship between education 
and sex ratios in India (Echavarri and Ezcurra, 2010). The debate revolves around 
whether increased education will lead people to change their values to have lower levels 
of son preference, and thereby will lead to less sex discrimination, or if more highly 
educated individuals are better able to act on their desires and utilize sex-selective 
technology, thereby increasing imbalanced sex ratios (Clark, 2000, Bhat and Zavier, 
2003). Recent work has suggested that the relationship between education and sex ratio 
follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, where initially with increasing education sex ratios 
become more imbalanced, and then sex ratios begin to fall at higher levels of educational 
attainment (Echavarri and Ezcurra, 2010).  This same work looked at female and male 
literacy separately, and found that they acted in the same direction, which is not 
consistent with the findings in this analysis, where female literacy and literacy overall 
acted in opposite directions.  
 
As districts became more highly educated overall (men and women combined), they 
increased in their imbalance. However, female literacy rate had the opposite effect (less 
imbalance with increased female literacy). This could suggest that women being more 







 i. Creation of New Districts 
 
The changing district and state boundaries over the past 30 years in India created 
challenges for merging the data from the censuses of each year. Newly created districts 
were given information about past indicators of the entire districts from which they were 
formed. It is possible that when a district divided, the portion of the original district from 
which the new district was formed had different levels of the covariates of interest than 
the district as a whole. If this is the case, than applying the full district rates of the 
original district for the newly formed district is problematic. However, there is limited (or 
no) information about the covariates of the sub-portion of the original district from which 
the new district was formed.  
 
 ii. Data Quality of the Census 
 
A vast body of literature has looked at the quality of the data collected in the census and 
Sample Registration System. There is evidence of underreporting of births, deaths, and 
age-misreporting throughout the country, with heterogeneity in quality between states 
(Retherford and Mishra, 2001). Larger states have been found to have better quality data. 
Using demographic estimation methods to test the quality of the data, other work has 
suggested that the quality was fairly good in the 1970s and 1980s, and deteriorated in the 
1990s. For example, Bhat (2002) found that under-enumeration for men was 0.7% worse 
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in the 1991 compared to 1981 census, and 1.4% worse for females (Bhat, 2002). The 
most recent 2011 census made a specific effort to improve enumeration of women 
(Navaneetham and Dharmalingam, 2011). Despite problems in the Indian censuses, it is 
the only source for district-level estimates of our variables of interest, and therefore our 
only source for answering these questions at a district-level (Guilmoto and Rajan, 2013).   
 
Most likely the under-enumeration is in more disadvantaged populations (poorer, more 
rural, more likely to be ST/SC). Since this analysis finds that sex ratios are more 
imbalanced in urban, wealthier, more educated populations, it is possible that imbalance 
is actually underrepresented. Assuming that whatever makes the data quality poorer in 
one state is consistent over time, then the fixed effects model helps control for these 
state/district-level factors. 
 
Fertility starting in 1981 was estimated at the district-level, and has, for the last four 
censuses, taken into account potential age misreporting and correct for poor quality data 
on morality (Guilmoto and Rajan, 2013, Guilmoto and Rajan, 2001).  There is evidence 
that reporting for children 6 and under in the censuses is fairly high quality, therefore the 
computation of the child sex ratio is straightforward (a ratio of girls/boys taken from the 
population age structure) (Bhat, 1996). Infant mortality has been estimated from the 
1981-2001 censuses at a district-level. Research double-checking the quality of the IMR 
trends calculated from the census by using the Brass method to calculate IMR (which 
takes into account problems in age misreporting and misreporting of infant and child 
mortality) found that the census estimates were fairly strong (Sarma and Choudhury, 
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2012). This paper does not attempt to correct for possible data quality problems using 




Despite India as a whole having increasingly imbalanced sex ratios, this analysis provides 
evidence that the districts and states that have been on the steepest downward slope in 
imbalance appear to be decelerating their decline and are beginning to see equalization in 
their child sex ratios. This gives hope that perhaps the states that had the most imbalanced 
sex ratios hit some type of inflection point from which they have begun to rebound up; 
the decline in sex ratios does not appear to fall indefinitely. However, the question 
remains as to whether the remaining (majority) of the districts in India will have to fall to 
the same level of imbalance before beginning to equalize. If this is the case, there would 
likely be many more years of increasingly imbalanced sex ratios before the country as a 
whole begins moving upwards, and even longer before sex ratios become close to normal 
(even).  This would mean many more years of discrimination against girls, both due to 
sex-selective abortions and excess mortality for girl children. Of course, as of yet, there is 
no evidence that this deceleration and upward trend will be sustained permanently or 
even temporarily. Understanding which of the components that makes up the child sex 
ratio (abortion and excess girl mortality) is responsible for the equalization seen in some 
districts and states is key to both reducing these practices and knowing how the trend will 
change in the future.  
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Evidence from this analysis helps us understand which populations might be at risk in 
future years of having increasingly imbalanced sex ratios. These findings suggest that as 
women’s literacy rate rises, we are likely to see increasingly imbalanced sex ratios, but as 
literacy for the population as a whole increases, this slope will decline and perhaps 
reverse. Declining fertility is unsurprisingly associated with sex ratio imbalance. 
Interestingly, states with larger ST populations showed more deceleration in their sex 
ratio imbalance, and this finding deserves more careful exploration.  
 
Further work needs to explore what factors are associated with the self-correction in sex 
ratios. A shortage of women in the marriage market or the labor market (therefore driving 
up women’s wages) may be mechanisms for this change. It is also possible that laws or 
program aimed to decrease sex-selective abortion or improve the status of girls have had 
an effect on this trend. Some evidence has suggested that the Post-natal Diagnostic 
Technique Act of 1996, which aimed to regulate and eliminate the misuse of sex-
selective technologies did not have an impact on the probability of a family having a boy 
(Subramanian and Selvaraj, 2009).  There have been a variety of schemes to improve the 
welfare of Indian girl children, but there are poor data on the extent and quality of their 
implementation and impact (Sekher, 2010, Sekher, 2012).  
 
While at first glance, the findings of this analysis are optimistic, in that sex ratio 
imbalance does not appear to continue downwards forever, if all states had to reach such 
a imbalanced sex ratio as is seen in the more imbalanced districts of India before 
beginning to equalize, the situation for girls in India would remain dire. Raising the 
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threshold at which states decelerate and reverse could potentially save the lives of 
millions of girl children, and reduce sex-selective abortions.  This analysis helps us 
understand the factors associated with this very nascent trend, and the next steps are to 










































































































Table 2.2: Ordinary least squares regression of the change in sex ratio in a 10 year period 
and the sex ratio 10 years prior. Indian children under 6. 
 Change in Girl:Boy Sex Ratio 
 A: 1981-1991 B: 1991-2001 C: 2001-2011 

















































Constant 273.89 -294.68 262.20 
N 573 552 590 
Adjusted R squared 0.2761 0.1586 0.3441 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 2.3: Population weighted Fixed effects Models: Testing robustness by adding and 
removing variables, Models A-F 















Percent of adults 
literate 






Percent of female 
adults literate 


















































































1,748 1,748 1,744 1,718 1,715 1,715 
R-squared 0.554 0.602 0.61 0.602 0.619 0.622 
Number of 
id 
590 590 590 590 590 590 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table 2.1: Data Sources 
 1981 1991 2001 2011 
CSR E E B B 
IMR D D F G 
TFR D D H H 
Population 
Size 
A A B B 
Percent SC A A C C 
Percent ST A A C C 
Literacy (total 
and female) 
 A A B B 
Percent Rural A A C C 
  
A: Directly from the Indian Census, sent in a STATA file by Vinod Mishra (General, 
1981, General, 1991) 
B: 2011 Indian Census: Primary Census Abstract (online) (Office of the Registrar 
General, 2013a) 
C: Census of India Website (Office of the Registrar General, 2013c) 
D: “Occasional paper No 1 of 1997, District Level Estimates of Fertility and Child 
Mortality for 1991 and their inter relation with other variables”, Registrar General, India 
(Office of Registrar General, 1997) 
E: Hand entered from Census Records in University of California, Berkeley library 
(General, 1981, General, 1991) 
F: “Birth History data of RCH, or District level estimates of child mortality in India based 
on the 2001 Census data”. Imprint  New Delhi : Office of the Registrar General, India, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, [2009] (Office of the Registrar General, 2009) 
G: Annual Health Survey 2010 (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Himachal  Pradesh) (Office of the 
Registrar General, 2013b) or Sample Registration Survey 2011 (Daman and Diu, Dadra 
and Nagar, Chandigarh) (Office of the Registrar General, 2013d) or state level Census 
data 2011 where could not find district-level estimates (Goa, Mizoram, Meghalaya, 
Manipur, Sikkim, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh) (Office of the Registrar General, 2013c) 
H: “Fertility at District Level in India: Lessons from the 2011 Census”, Christophe Z 
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DECOMPOSING EQUALIZING CHILD SEX RATIOS IN INDIA INTO FERTILITY 





“The tragedy of the world’s 160 million missing girls isn’t that they’re ‘missing.’ 







Despite an overall downward trend in child sex ratios in India between the 2001 and 2011 
censuses, a few of the districts that were the most imbalanced in 2001 (fewer girls than 
boys) showed signs of equalization in 2011. This analysis looks in depth at these districts 
to better understand the nature of the equalization. First I decompose the equalization into 
(1) equalization due to less pre-birth events (presumably from sex-selective abortion) and 
(2) equalization due to improved girl child mortality compared to boy child mortality.  To 
decompose the trends, I use data from life tables to reverse-survive the populations of 
children alive in 2001 and 2011, applying information on ratios of child survival at a 
district compared to state level to estimate district-level trends. I find that most of the 
equalization is due to reductions in pre-birth events, although these events still make up 
the majority of the cause of imbalanced sex ratios. There are four main clusters of 
districts where the sex ratios are beginning to equalize: in the north in Punjab, Haryana, 
Delhi, and Chandigarh; the west around the capital of Gujarat; the south from Tamil 
Nadu up through Karnataka; and in the northeast states. I explore the trend in the 
decomposition by these geographic clusters and find little difference between clusters. I 
then decompose the child sex ratio in rural and urban areas of each district and find that 
equalization is happening in both rural and urban areas in most areas, but there has been a 
greater increase in the amount of the contribution to imbalance from excess female 
mortality in urban areas over time. Finally, I test whether there is an association between 
the level of child mortality and the percent of the imbalanced child sex ratio that is from 
pre-birth events. This analysis finds that the higher the female child mortality, the lower 
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the contribution from pre-birth events in 2001, but there is no relationship in 2011. 
Declines in pre-birth events and excess female mortality are contributing to the 
equalization in child sex ratios, but pre-birth events still make up the majority of the 






The most recent Indian Census (2011) showed that the country as a whole had a lower 
child sex ratio than in previous years, having fallen from 928 girls/1000 boys in 2001 to 
914 girls/1000 boys in 2011 (Registrar General of India, 2011). However, some of the 
districts with the most imbalanced child sex ratios in 2001 showed signs of equalization 
in 2011. This analysis looks in depth at the districts that showed evidence of equalization 
to understand the trends and causes of the equalization.  I decompose the child sex ratio 
into fertility and mortality related components, and explore these by geographic clusters 
and urban/rural areas.  
 
The child sex ratio is defined as the number of girls divided by the number of boys under 
the age of five (unless otherwise stated, sometimes ages 0-6 are included to take age 
heaping on age five into account). Child sex ratios are the result of two components: the 
sex ratio at birth and differentials in child mortality by sex (in this case, higher mortality 
for girls). Imbalanced sex ratios at birth in India are most likely due to sex-selective 
abortion, while differentials in mortality are due to gender-based differences in feeding 
practices, health care seeking behavior, and immunization rates that counteract an 
underlying frailty disadvantage of males (Mishra et al., 2004, Arnold et al., 1998, 
Claeson et al., 2000). In populations without gender preference, male infants have higher 
rates of mortality than female infants in general, especially in the neonatal period (Wells, 
2000). Therefore, we would expect female children to have better mortality rates than 
male children, rather than worse, as is seen in India by the imbalanced child sex ratio. 
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There is evidence that environmental stresses differentially affect human fetuses by sex, 
for example, terrorism, extreme temperatures, and economic instability can lead to the 
spontaneous abortion of male fetuses and thus alter the sex ratio (Catalano et al., 2008, 
Catalano et al., 2006, Catalano, 2003). However, we have no reason to believe that some 
sustained environmental pressures have imbalanced the sex ratio in India in the past in 
one direction and are now acting in the opposite direction (evening out the child sex 
ratio).  If anything, over the last 15 years India has seen more of its population escape 
poverty than ever before in history (Ravallion, 2009). If there is a biological basis for pre-
birth influences on the sex ratio it would be a case where economic stressors became less 
prevalent.  It is simply unknown whether these economic improvements for India’s poor 
lowered the number of spontaneous abortions for male infants.  At the same time, there is 
literature to support the hypothesis that sex-selective abortions are an important cause of 
the imbalanced sex ratio at birth in India (Oomman and Ganatra, 2002, Arnold et al., 
2002). However, in this analysis I am only able to estimate the sex ratio at birth, and not 
its cause, therefore, I will refer to the causes of the imbalanced sex ratio at birth as “pre-
birth events.”  
 
Work by Jha et al. in 2012 suggested that much of the dramatic decline in child sex ratios 
seen in the 2011 census was due to increases in sex-selective abortions (assuming that all 
of the cause of imbalanced sex ratio at birth was due to abortion), rather than increases in 
excess female child mortality (Jha et al., 2011). However, this finding was for the country 
as a whole where sex ratios are falling overall. It is not yet clear if the districts that 
showed signs of equalization in child sex ratios did so more because of changes in the sex 
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ratio at birth or because mortality for girls (relative to boys) has improved. There have 
been substantial reductions in child mortality in India over the past decades, but a 
mortality gap between females and males still exists in many states (Ram et al., 2013).  
Past literature has shown that girls receive less/poorer quality nutrients, are breastfed for 
less time, taken to health facilities less frequently when ill, and receiver fewer 
immunizations, all of which lead to excess mortality of girls under age five (Mishra et al., 
2004, Arnold et al., 1998, Claeson et al., 2000).  Therefore, despite improvements in 
child mortality overall, females are still disadvantaged compared to males, contributing to 
the child sex ratio differential.  
 
India’s current population is over 1.2 billion, divided into 35 states and territories and 
over 600 districts. Districts range in population from 7,948 (Dibang Valley, Andhra 
Pradesh) to over 11 million (Thane, Maharashtra), with over 70% of districts having 
more than a million people (Registrar General of India, 2011).  Therefore, examining 
district-level trends and breaking up districts into rural/urban components are important 
because many contain large and diverse populations. Past literature has stressed the 
importance of considering indicators such as mortality, fertility, and gender preference at 
the district-level for understanding trends and patterns in India (Murthi et al., 1995). 
 
Not only is India very large, but it is also extremely heterogeneous. There is a strong 
cultural divide between the north and south, and other regions of the country are defined 
by very different languages, practices, and socio-economic situations (Dyson and Moore, 
1983).  Urban/rural differences have been well documented in India for various indicators 
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of health and development. For example, rural women have been found to want more 
sons and have higher fertility than urban women, and people living in rural areas have 
less access to health care (Clark, 2000, Jeffery and Jeffery, 2000, Balarajan et al., 2011). 
Child sex ratios first began becoming imbalanced in urban areas, where people were 
more educated, had lower fertility, and had more access to sex-selective technologies 
(Bhat and Zavier, 2007, Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997). Over time, child sex ratios began 
falling in rural areas as well, with the introduction of mobile ultrasound clinics, increases 
in education, wealth, and declining fertility (Retherford and Roy, 2003, Bardia et al., 
2004, Khanna, 1997). Therefore, exploring geographic and urban/rural differences is 
important for understanding any trend in India.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This analysis relies on data from the Indian censuses of 2001 and 2011 and the Indian 
Sample Registration System in various years (Office of the Registrar General, 2011, 
Registrar General of India, 2001, Office of the Registrar General, 2013d). Between 2001 
and 2011, 47 new districts were formed in India (increasing the number of districts from 
593 to 640). In some cases districts split into two parts, and in other cases pieces of older 
districts were pulled off and a new conglomeration of a district was created. In situations 
where the district split into two parts, data from the 2001 census are applied to both new 
districts in 2011. In cases where a new district was formed from pieces of multiple former 
districts, information from 2001 about the district that made up the largest percent of the 
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new district in 2011 is applied to the new 2011 district. This did in some cases lead to 
problems in calculations, which are discussed below.  
 
I. Decomposition Methods 
 
District-level estimates of child sex ratios are published for the 2001 and 2011 censuses. 
Sex ratios at birth are back calculated from life table estimates calculated from the 
Sample Registration System for 1996-2000 and 2006-2010 (Registrar General, 2013). For 
2001, the following equation is used for back calculation (this was done for males and 
females separately) to estimate the number of births, and then the sex ratio at birth is 
calculated from that. Equations 1-3 are shown for males (m): 
 
5L0m  = 1L0m +4L1m         (Eq 1) 
 
Where:2  
1L0 = person years lived from age 0 to 1 
4L1 = person years lived from age 1 to 5 
 
Survival ratiom = 5L0m/(5ul0m)       (Eq 2) 
 
                                                        
2 The notation for the life table variables is as follows: the subscript on the right is the 
start age, and the subscript on the left is how many years the interval covers. So, 5L0m  is 





l0 = radix population at age 0 (100,000) 
 
Number of birthsm =(1/Survival ratiom) u (Populationm age 0-4 in 2001) 
           (Eq 3) 
Equation 1 calculates the person years lived up to age 5 by adding together 1L0 and 4L1. 
Equation 2 then calculates the survival ratio, which is the person years lived up to age 
five (5L0), divided by 5 times l0.  This lets us know what proportion of those born 
survived to age five. Equation 3 calculates the number of births in that time period by 
multiplying the inverse of the survival ratio (which could be thought of as the mortality 
ratio) by the population aged 0 to 4 in 2001 (5 years). This is done separately for males 
and females and the sex ratio at birth is the number of females born in that time period 
divided by the number of males born in that time period.  
The Sample Registration System life tables are currently only estimated at a state level. 
Therefore, to estimate the district-level l0 and 5L0, I employ the method used by Kumar 
and Sathyanarayana (2012), where the ratio of child mortality at a district-level to the 
state level child mortality is applied to the state level life table functions (Kumar and 
Sathyanarayana, 2012). District-level child mortality (CMR) estimates by sex from the 
2001 census were published by the Registrar General (Registrar General of India, 2008). 
The ratio of district to state (ș) is calculated for each district using equation 4:  
ș = (1000-CMR_ district)/ (1000-CMR_state)     (Eq 4) 
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Then, the district-level survival ratio is calculated using the following equation:  
5LD0  șu 5LS0         (Eq 5) 
Where the superscript D=district and S=state. This equation is calculated separately for 
males and females for each district that had showed evidence of equalization in sex ratio. 
From these calculations, the survival ratio and then the number of births are calculated 
for each district and sex as shown in equations 2 and 3.  
 
The same procedure is used to estimate the sex ratio at birth in 2011, except that since the 
child population data is given for ages 0-6 instead of 0-4, the survival ratio must take that 
into account. Therefore, the following equation is used:  
 
Survival ratiom = 7L0m/(7ul0m)        (Eq 7) 
 
In order to calculate 7L0m I need to add together the person years lived up to age six (L’s) 
from the life table for 0-1, 1-5 and a portion of 5-10. I assume that deaths were evenly 
distributed between the ages of 6-10, therefore, 2/5 of 5L5m is added to the other two 
values.3 The following equation is used to calculate 7L0m: 
 
7L0m = 1L0m + 4L1m + (5L5m u (2/5))      (Eq 8) 
 
                                                        
3 Model life tables do not break down the 5-10 age group into single year survival 
probabilities, so we were unable to apply a more nuanced distribution (UNITED 
NATIONS 1982. Model Life Tables for Developing Countries. , New York, United 
Nations ).  
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Estimates of child mortality at a district-level are not yet available for the 2011 census. 
The Annual Health Survey of India (collected in 2010) publishes estimates of child 
mortality at a district-level but only for a few states (relevant to this study: Assam, Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Rajasthan) (Registrar General and Census 
Commissioner, 2012)7KHUHIRUHWKHVHGDWDDUHXVHGWRFDOFXODWHWKHUDWLRșLQHTXDWLRQ
4, and 7LD0  in equation 5.  
 
For the remaining states (Gujarat, Punjab, Haryana, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, 
West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra) only state level data on child mortality 
were available from the Sample Registration System for 2011(Office of the Registrar 
General, 2013d). Therefore, the 2001 child mortality ratio (ș) is used to estimate the 
appropriate district to state ratio in for those districts in 2011.   
 
Once the estimated sex ratio at birth is calculated, the contribution to the imbalanced sex 
ratio from child mortality is calculated by subtracting the child sex ratio from the 
estimated sex ratio at birth. The contribution to the imbalanced sex ratio from pre-birth 
events is 1000 minus the sex ratio at birth. I look at trends over time in the contribution of 
these various components to understand if the equalization is due to changes in child 






i. Decomposition: Urban/Rural 
 
The 2001 census published data on the child population aged 0-4 by sex in urban and 
rural areas by district (Registrar General of India, 2001). However, thus far, the 2011 
census has only published data on the child population aged 0-6 in rural and urban areas 
per district. Due to lack of other data sources, these two populations are compared, 
despite the slightly different age group (Registrar General of India, 2011). I assume that 
the ratio of children aged 0-6 and 0-4 will be the same, even though the population sizes 
most likely differ. This assumption would not hold if there were differences in the female 
mortality rate relative to males pre-age four and post age four. While we do not have age 
and sex specific mortality rates post age five for India, I have no reason to believe that 
there is a radical shift in female mortality compared to male mortality for the age group 
5-6 compared to 4-5. Data were not available for the urban/rural contribution for the 
following smaller states: Andaman and Nicobar, Chhattisgarh, and Pondicherry, 
therefore, these were dropped from the analysis.  
 
District-level child sex ratios are calculated for rural and urban populations. The urban 
and rural child sex ratios are first compared to their respective child sex ratio in 
2001/2011, to see if urban or rural areas generally have higher or lower child sex ratios 
than the population as a whole. Then, the change in child sex ratios between urban and 
rural areas over time is calculated, to see if the equalization found is only occurring in 
urban or rural areas, or in both. I then decompose the child sex ratio from rural and urban 
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areas into the fertility and mortality components, using the methods described above (Eqs 
1-8).  
 
ii. Decomposition: Geographic Clusters 
 
Changing child sex ratios and the decomposed contribution from pre-birth events and 
mortality are then examined based on spatial clusters of equalizing districts identified 
when looking at the geographic pattern of where districts are equalizing in India. The 
goal of this is to explore whether there are differences in the contribution to the changing 
child sex ratio in different regions of the country (spatially). I look at these three 
indicators in the four identified clusters of equalization, and explored whether there are 
differences in the four geographical clusters.  
 
iii. Decomposition: Is there a tradeoff?  
 
Finally, I explore whether there is a tradeoff occurring between declines in mortality and 
changing pre-birth behavior with the changing nature of child sex ratios. To do this, I 
create quartiles of child mortality for males and females in both 2001 and 2011. I then see 
if these quartiles are associated with the percent of the imbalance that is due to pre-birth 







Of the 640 districts in India in 2011, 153 of them show signs of equalization (the 
remainder worsened) in their child sex ratios between 2001 and 2011 (Table 3.1).  
 
Fig 3.1. Map of India with districts in which the child sex ratio equalized between 2001 
and 2011, shown in red.  
 
Figure 1 shows the districts that showed equalization in child sex ratio between 2001 and 
2011 in red, in all other districts the child sex ratio fell between the two time points. 
Some of the districts that equalized are clustered in four regions, while the rest are 
scattered. Starting at the North, many of the districts that showed equalization are in 
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Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and the territories of Delhi and Chandigarh. There is 
some spill over into Rajasthan and Uttrakhand. Seventeen out of the 21 districts in 
Haryana showed equalization, and 20 of the 22 districts in Punjab showed equalization. 
This cluster also includes much of New Delhi and Chandigarh.  
 
The second cluster of districts is in Gujarat, in western India. Twelve of the 32 districts in 
Gujarat showed equalization, and these are clustered around the capital of Gujarat, 
Ahmedabad. The third cluster is in the south, mostly occurring in Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka, with some spill over into Kerala and Maharashtra, although not all districts in 
these states have shown equalization. The fourth cluster is the Northeastern region, on the 
eastern side of Bangladesh, and includes districts in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, but not all districts in any one of these states.  
 
 




Fig 3.3: Histogram of child sex ratios in 2011 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of child sex ratios in India as a whole in 2001 and 
2011. While the peak density of child sex ratio level did not shift much, it did become 
less dense. The left tail became more dense and the right tail shorter in 2011 compared to 
2001, showing that most districts in India have become more imbalanced in their child 
sex ratio.  
 
Fig 3.4: Scatterplot of the child sex ratio in 2001 vs 2011 
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Figure 4 shows the child sex ratio in 2001 compared to the child sex ratio in 2011 for 
every district in India. The districts that showed equalization in their child sex ratio stand 
out by being above the 45 degree line that the majority of districts lie along.  
  
The mean child sex ratio in 2001 for the 153 districts that showed equalization was 885, 
ranging from 766 to 979. In 2011, this group of districts had a CSR of 905, ranging from 
790 to 1013. The over all mean change in child sex ratio was 22, ranging from 1 to 87 
(Table 3.1). As a comparison, in India as a whole child sex ratios fell by a mean of 8 (8 
fewer girls in 2011 than in 2001), ranging from -98 to 87 between 2001 and 2011. For 
these analyses, I needed to use data on children under five by rural/urban, and by 
population size. The Registrar General of India publishes population data by age and sex 
for ages 0-4 in 2001 and 0-6 in 2011, these are also available by urban/rural status. 
Therefore, I constructed my own child sex ratios from these data. The difference between 
the child sex ratios I constructed and the official published child sex ratios are shown in 
Table 3.1. My estimates had the same child sex ratio in 2001, and a child sex ratio 2 
points higher in 2011. 
 
I. Decomposition  
 
The Sample Registration System only constructed life tables for the larger states in India, 
therefore, I was unable to look at the districts from smaller states in this analysis. 
Districts from following states were dropped from the analysis: Andaman and Nicobar, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Chandigarh, Delhi, Jharkhand, Manipur, Mizoram, 
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Nagaland, Pondicherry, and Tripura.  For twenty-one of the districts, the child sex ratio I 
constructed from the available data (as discussed above) did not show signs of 
equalization. Of these, the majority were within 5 points of each other, so I kept these in 
the analysis, however, I dropped the data for 11 districts where the 2001 child sex ratio 
was more than 5 points greater than the 2011 child sex ratio. Some of these districts were 
districts where boarders changed over time, so larger district data from 2001 were applied 
to smaller districts in 2011 (Table 3.2).  
 
The mean district-level survival ratios for both males and females fell between 2001 and 
2011 (Table 3.3). This makes sense because the survival ratios for 2001 are for children 
0-4 and the survival ratios for 2011 are for children 0-6, therefore, I would expect more 
children to die by age six than by age four. Since these survival ratios are applied to a 
larger population in 2011 than 2001, the smaller size of the 2011 survival ratio is taken 
into account.  
 
In 2001, the mean contribution to the imbalanced sex ratio from events prior to birth was 
114 (ranging from 16 to 236), and the contribution from differentials in child mortality 
was about 7 (ranging from -14 to 33) (Table 3.4). In 2011, the mean contribution from 
events prior to birth was 93 (ranging from 4 to 200), and the contribution from child 
mortality was about 4 (ranging from -16 to 29).  In both years, events prior to birth 
played a larger role in the imbalanced sex ratio, although this was on average lower in 
2011 than 2001. The contribution from differentials in child mortality was larger in 2001 
than 2011, although of much smaller magnitude. The negative values indicate that in 
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some state girls have better survival than boys in under 5, therefore, differences in 
mortality actually acts as a way for girls to catch up from imbalance due to pre-birth 
events in these districts. Between 2001 and 2011, the contribution to the sex ratio from 
excess child mortality increased by an average of about -3 girls, and the contribution 
from events prior to birth fell by an average of about 20 girls.  
 
Percentage-wise, the average percent of imbalance due to events prior to birth was 93.7% 
in 2001, and dropped to 92.5% in 2011 (Table 3.5). The percent of imbalance due to 
excess female child mortality increased slightly from 6.3% in 2001 to 7.5% in 2011.  
 
i. Decomposition: Urban/Rural 
 
When I created child sex ratios for rural and urban populations separately by district, 
there were 17 districts that showed negative change in child sex ratios in both rural and 
urban areas. A closer examination of these districts showed that they were districts that 
either split into parts over the time period, so the values in 2001 refer to a larger 
population than the data in 2011, or these were districts with very small populations in 
either urban or rural areas. As mentioned above, child populations 0-4 in 2001 were 
compared to child populations 0-6 in the 2011 census. Theoretically, when looking at 
ratios alone, this should not result in too big of a problem, however, in some of the 
districts with very small urban or rural populations, it is possible that some problems may 
arise. These 17 districts were therefore dropped from the analysis.  Furthermore, there 
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were 7 districts that were either completely rural or completely urban, or missing all data, 
and these were also dropped from the analysis (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.6 shows the change in the child sex ratio from 2001 to 2011 in rural and urban 
areas in the 123 remaining districts. Urban areas equalized by a larger magnitude than 
rural areas. The average change in urban areas was 26.3, and was 17.26 in rural areas. 
Eighty-one (66%) of the districts showed equalization in both rural and urban areas. 
Seventeen (13%) showed equalization only in rural areas, and 25 (20%) in only urban 
areas.  
 
The contribution to the child sex ratio from child mortality in 2001 was about 17 in rural 
areas and -2 in urban areas (Table 3.7). The contribution to the child sex ratio from per-
birth events was higher in urban areas than rural areas in 2001, with about 111 and 130 
missing girls in rural and urban areas, respectively. The contribution from child mortality 
in 2011 was almost three times higher in rural than urban areas in 2011 (about 12 and 4 
missing girls respectively). The contribution from pre-birth events in 2011 was higher in 
urban compared to rural areas, at 91 and 99 missing girls respectively. The contribution 
from child mortality in rural areas decreased by about 6 female child deaths, however in 
urban areas it increased by about 5 female child deaths. The contribution from pre-birth 





ii. Decomposition: Geographic Clusters 
 
Four clusters were analyzed. The “North” cluster included all districts that showed 
equalization in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, because all of these are contiguous. The 
“West” cluster included all the districts that showed equalization in Gujarat, with the 
exception of Navsari, which was separated from the main cluster by more than one other 
district. The “South” cluster included all districts that showed equalization in Tamil 
Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, except for Chandrapur in Maharashtra 
because, again, it was distinct from the main cluster. The “Northeast” cluster was 
dropped from this analysis because data was only available for 4 districts in Assam. The 
other states in this region do not have the necessary life table estimates available to do the 
decomposition. The most concentrated part of the equalization in the northeast was in 
Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, which would have been excluded from this analysis. 
 
The mean child sex ratio was much lower in the north and west clusters in both 2001 and 
2011, with the northern cluster having a child sex ratio of 803 and 842 in 2001 and 2011, 
respectively, and the western cluster a child sex ratio of 861 and 879 in 2001 and 2011 
(Table 3.8). These two clusters are below the national average child sex ratio in both 
years. Child sex ratios were not as severely imbalanced in the southern and northeastern 
clusters, with the southern cluster having child sex ratios of 929 and 942 in 2001 and 
2011 respectively, and the northeast cluster child sex ratios of 951 and 957 in 2001 and 
2011. These two clusters are above the national average child sex ratio in both years.  
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In all clusters, pre-birth events made up the majority of the contribution to the 
imbalanced sex ratio (Table 3.8). It appears that mortality makes up a large percent of the 
distribution in the West compared to the north and south. The percent of the contribution 
from mortality fell over time in the south and west, however, it increased in the north. 
Overall, the differences by region were not dramatic.  
 
iii. Decomposition: Is there a tradeoff?  
 
Quartiles of the child mortality rate for males and females in 2001 and 2011 were 
constructed and regressed on the percent of the imbalance in the child sex ratio that was 
due to pre-birth events, controlling for overall level of the child sex ratio. The higher the 
male child mortality quartile (a higher quartile means higher child mortality rate), the 
greater the percent of the imbalance from pre-birth events in 2001 (p<0.01) (Table 3.9). 
Conversely, the higher the female child mortality quartile, the lower the percent of the 
imbalance from pre-birth events in 2001 (p<0.000). However, there was no association 
between the level of either male or female child mortality and the percent of the 
imbalance from pre-birth events in 2011. The level of the child sex ratio was not 









In the districts that showed signs of equalization in child sex ratios between 2001 and 
2011, pre-birth events are the primary cause of the imbalanced child sex ratio, both in 
2001 and 2011. Pre-birth events contributed on average about 113 excess missing girls in 
2001 in these districts, and about 93 excess girls on average in 2011. Therefore, although 
the magnitude of imbalance due to pre-birth events is still very large, it has declined in 
these districts between 2001 and 2011.  The contribution to the imbalanced child sex ratio 
from excess female child mortality fell between the two time periods (from about 7 in 
2001 to about 4 in 2011), and the magnitude of this contribution is still very small.  
Overall, the change in the contribution from child mortality between 2001 and 2011 was 
not large, decreasing by 3 (meaning there were 3 fewer excess girls per 1000 boys due to 
mortality), while the contribution from pre-birth events fell by about 20. Percentage-wise, 
the majority of the cause of imbalance was due to pre-birth events and it fell only slightly 
between the two time points (from about 94% to 92.5%). Child mortality contributed 
about 6-7% of imbalance. Therefore, although the magnitude of contribution from pre-
birth events and from mortality fell over time, the relative contribution from each 
remained fairly stable.  
 
The districts in which child sex ratios equalized between 2001 and 2011 were mostly 
clustered in four regions: the north around Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, and Chandigarh; the 
west around the capital for Gujarat; the south extending contiguously from southern 
Tamil Nadu up through Karnataka; and the northeastern region, east of Bangladesh. The 
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north and west two clusters are similar in that their child sex ratios had become extremely 
low (very imbalanced)—they were in fact two of the most imbalanced regions in the 
country in 2001. Child sex ratios in the south and northeastern clusters were not as 
imbalanced in 2001 (or 2011)—they are higher than the national average. These areas 
have traditionally had much lower rates of son preference and less imbalanced sex ratios 
(or not imbalanced at all) compared to the rest of the country (Dyson and Moore, 1983). 
That the south and northeast clusters declined a little in the 2001 census but begun to 
equalize by the 2011 census suggests that these areas might not actually have the same 
sloping downward trend seen in other parts of India, and might stabilize back at more 
even sex ratios in the years to come. There was no clear trend in differences in the 
decomposition between clusters, except perhaps evidence that the west had a higher 
proportion of the imbalance due to mortality.  
 
The pattern of the southern cluster is interesting because it is fairly narrow and follows 
the contours of the West Ghats, which are a north to south mountain range separating 
much of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Past literature has described an “infanticide belt” in 
Tamil Nadu, which is very similar to the stretch of equalizing districts found in this 
analysis in the south (Chunkath and Athreya, 1997, Vella and Oliveau, 2005). Vella and 
Oliveau (2005) argue that infanticide spread from a few specific areas in Tamil Nadu to 
contiguous districts through social diffusion. Specifically, they suggest that the Kongu 
Vellalar Gounders caste had high son preference and infanticide because of their work in 
agricultural, and since this is a high caste, these practices were spread via social 
propagation to lower castes in nearby districts (Vella and Oliveau, 2005). Much attention 
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has been paid to the high levels of infanticide in this region, and therefore many programs 
and government efforts have focused on reducing female infanticide in this region 
(Athreya and Chunkath, 2000). Perhaps, therefore, the equalization in the child sex ratio 
in this area is due to reductions in infanticide following the same diffusion pattern along 
the “infanticide belt” as in the past (Srinivasan and Bedi, 2008, Vella and Oliveau, 2005). 
More research on this is needed. 
 
In northeast India, the districts that have shown equalization are not as contiguous as the 
other clusters, and are scattered amongst a number of states. It is possible that this does 
not actually represent a cluster of equalization. These states have a very different culture 
than the rest of India, have higher proportions of tribal populations, and have experienced 
political unrest and violence in the recent decades due to a separatist movement 
(Shimray, 2004). Due to the unrest, conducting research in this area has been difficult, 
and very little research on gender preference or child sex ratios has occurred in this 
region. Interestingly, some states in the northeast, such as Meghalaya, have a tradition of 
daughter preference, which could help explain the rebound from the slightly imbalanced 
sex ratios seen in the past (Narzary and Sharma, 2013). More research on gender 
preferences in this part of the country could help us understand the trends in child sex 
ratios seen today.   
 
On initial inspection it appears that the cluster of equalizing districts are grouped around 
urban centers. The northern cluster is the densest, with nearly every district in Punjab and 
Haryana, as well as much of Delhi and Chandigarh showing equalization. These are two 
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of the most developed, modern, and richest cities in India.  The western cluster, in 
Gujarat, includes the capital of Gujarat (Ahmedabad) and Vadodara, the third largest city 
in Gujarat. In southern India, the cluster of districts includes Madurai, which is the third 
largest city in Tamil Nadu; Thiruvananthapuram, which is the capital of Kerala; and 
Bangalore, the capital of Karnataka, as well as other big cities in each of these states. 
Most of the districts that showed equalization in the northeastern cluster are not in urban 
centers, except for Aizawl, the capital of Mizoram, and Kohima, the capital of Nagaland. 
Other social trends in India, and elsewhere, have been shown to be spatially continuous, 
for example, the Indian fertility decline and imbalanced sex ratios (missing daughters) 
(Guilmoto and Rajan, 2001, Kuzhiparambil and Rajani, 2012, Guilmoto, 2008). These 
past studies have suggested that because spatial variations in social variables are not 
random and are geographically related, this provides evidence that processes at the micro 
level, rather than factors such as programs/campaigns or changes in economic 
development, are more important drivers of these trends. 
 
As discussed above, sex ratios first began becoming imbalanced in urban areas, and this 
spread to rural areas, therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that many of these clusters 
surround urban centers (Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997, Bhat and Zavier, 2007). However, 
not all of the clusters included urban centers, so this is not the driving force uniformly. 
Interestingly, the clusters in the north and west, which differ from the other clusters in 
that they have the most imbalanced sex ratios, were more focused around urban areas 
than the other clusters. Perhaps the relationship between social trends initiating in urban 
settings and the subsequent diffusion of behaviors plays a larger role in areas of extreme 
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sex ratio imbalance, and is less important in areas where the child sex ratio was not as 
imbalanced to begin with.   
 
There was not a large difference in child sex ratios between rural and urban areas, 
although urban areas equalized slightly more than rural areas between 2001 and 2011. 
The majority of the districts explored at the urban/rural level showed equalization in both 
rural and urban areas, suggesting that this trend is not restricted to only certain sub-
populations. Of the districts that only showed equalization in either urban or rural areas, 
more showed equalization in urban areas, suggesting that the trend may be originating in 
these areas first. Other related trends in India (such as fertility decline and imbalanced 
child sex ratios) originated in urban areas, so we hypothesized that the same trend would 
occur with equalization in child sex ratios. Many of the districts that showed equalization 
are in more developed states, and closer to major metropolitan centers (such as Delhi). 
These findings support past findings that these trends often originate in urban settings or 
near urban centers, but the equalization in child sex ratios is not limited to urban areas.  
 
Child mortality contributed to the child sex ratio by about 17 female child deaths in 2001 
in rural areas, however, child mortality in 2001 in urban areas was actually a corrective 
force, reducing the imbalance by about 2 births. In 2011, child mortality contributed to 
the imbalance in both rural and urban areas, although more so in rural than urban areas. 
Pre-birth events made up the majority of the imbalance in both rural and urban areas in 
2001 and 2011, and the magnitude was less in 2011 and greater in urban areas in both 
years.   The amount of imbalance due to mortality declined in rural areas between 2001 
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and 2011, meaning there was less excess female mortality, however, it increased in urban 
areas. 
 
This could be reflective of past findings that the child mortality rate has slowed, 
stagnated, and even increased in India in recent years (Saikia et al., 2010, Saikia et al., 
2009). There was a greater decline between 2001 and 2011 in the amount of the 
contribution due to pre-birth events in urban areas compared to rural, however, the 
overall magnitude of the contribution is still larger in urban compared to rural areas. In 
summary, rural and urban areas differ slightly in the make up of their imbalanced child 
sex ratio, and there is evidence that the contribution to the imbalance from excess female 
mortality has actually increased in urban areas (the mortality situation for girls has 
worsened in urban areas).  
 
These findings highlight that the decline in child mortality for girls lags behind the 
decline for boys, as has been noted elsewhere (Ram et al., 2013). Hill and Upchurch 
(1995), using Demographic and Health Survey data from around the world to look at 
gender differences in child mortality, found that when male child mortality declines, the 
female advantage in under 5 mortality declines (Hill and Upchurch, 1995).Therefore, in 
the absence of gender preference and uneven care-giving practices, with development, we 
would expect it to appear that girls fare worse. Future research should focus on the 
reasons that improvements in mortality for girls under age five lags behind improvements 
in mortality for boys. 
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While it is possible that the imbalance in the sex ratio at birth is due to environmental or 
biological causes, much past literature has suggested that sex-selective abortion is the 
primary cause (Oomman and Ganatra, 2002, Arnold et al., 2002).  Sex-selective abortion 
has been illegal in India for almost 20 years, and there are many efforts to reduce access 
to sex determination techniques (it is important to not restrict access to abortion itself, 
which has been legal in India, since the 1970s). Additionally, there have been a plethora 
of efforts in India aimed to reduce the preference for sons or increase the preference 
daughters—from education/media campaigns to programs that offer incentives for 
families to have daughters (Sekher, 2010, Sekher, 2012). Assuming that most of the 
imbalance at birth is due to abortion, the finding that the magnitude of sex-selective 
abortion has gone down provides evidence that either families are not seeking sex-
selective abortions, or they are less able to determine the sex of their fetuses even if they 
do want to. Changing preferences would indicate a possibility of more equalization in the 
future in a potentially larger geographic area, as social trends and preferences often 
spread. However, even if the change is due to better restrictions on sex-selective 
abortions (and not on changing preferences), this is still an improvement on previous 
decades of poor success in restricting sex-selective technology. Future research should 
aim to understand whether changing preferences or reduced access to sex-selective 
abortions are responsible for the equalization in the sex ratio at birth. 
 
It is possible that as child mortality falls (especially for females), families who do not 
want daughters are more likely to rely on pre-birth sex-selective abortion as a means of 
achieving their desired family composition. Conversely, others have argued that access to 
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pre-natal sex determination and abortion should allow those girls that are born to be more 
“wanted” and therefore excess girl-child mortality would decrease with increasing sex-
selective abortion (Sudha and Rajan, 2003). Additionally, others have argued that these 
two practices are additive, or even re-enforce and strengthen each other, and that this is 
why we have seen increasingly imbalanced sex ratios in children in countries like India 
and China recently (Goodkind, 1996). This analysis provides evidence in 2001 that the 
percent of imbalance due to pre-birth events increases with higher male child mortality 
and decreases with higher female child mortality, however, this does not appear to be the 
case in 2011. Therefore, this analysis does not provide evidence that a tradeoff between 




One set of limitations in this study comes from lack of complete and consistent data for 
all districts at the two time points. Age-data by sex and rural/urban status was only 
available for ages 0-4 in 2001 and 0-6 in 2011. This leads to some potential for errors 
when comparing these two age groups. Substantial evidence exists for age-heaping on 
age five in the censuses of India and National Family Health Surveys in India (Retherford 
and Mishra, 2001, Bhat et al., 1984). Generally, it is accepted that using the 0-6 age 
group is better than the 0-4 age group because it helps account for age-heaping (Guilmoto 
and Rajan, 2002). This is part of the reason that the 2011 child population data is given in 
0-6, as opposed to 0-4 in 2001 (Kulkarni, 2013). However, as long as people do not 
differentially age-heap boys compared to girls, this should not bias these results since I 
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am primarily interested in comparing ratios. Data on age structure is not yet published for 
all districts in 2011, therefore, some districts had to be dropped from the analysis.  
 
District-level life tables have not yet been calculated, therefore, I had to estimate person-
years lived up to various ages at a district-level by applying ratios of child mortality at a 
district-level compared to the state level. This method was used by Kumar and 
Sathyanarayana (2012), and should not introduce too much error since life table estimates 
are derived from child mortality estimates (Kumar and Sathyanarayana, 2012). 
Additionally, district-level child mortality estimates are not yet available for the 2011 
census, therefore, I had to use Annual Health Survey (AHS) estimates from 2010 for the 
states from which these data were available. However, AHS is not collected in all states, 
therefore, in those without AHS data, 2001 child mortality ratios were applied to 2011. 
Kumar and Sathyanarayana (2012) state that, “at moderate levels of mortality, birth rate 
estimates from the reverse survival procedure are not that sensitive to errors in child 
mortality estimates” (p. 68) (Kumar and Sathyanarayana, 2012). They also cite work by 
Bhat (1996) that showed that in India a 10% error in child mortality estimates only 
resulted in a 2% error in the estimates of crude birth rate, suggesting that even if there are 
small errors introduced by applying child mortality ratios from 2001 to 2011, this should 
not affect subsequent estimates too much (Bhat, 1996).  
 
Additionally, there was no life table information for smaller states, namely Andaman and 
Nicobar; Arunachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Delhi, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Pondicherry, Tripura, and Uttarakhand. Therefore, these 
 80 
had to be dropped from the decomposition analysis. Many of these states are in the 
northeast region, hence the regional analysis of this cluster only had four districts in it 
from Assam. These reflect a small part of this region, and therefore the findings may not 
be reflective of the overall trends in that area.  
 
Another source of bias in the analysis is that districts have changed between 2001 and 
2011, and new districts have been created. As discussed above, in the cases where one 
district split into two parts, the same information from the larger district in 2001 was 
applied to both of the smaller new district in 2011. In the cases where a new district was 
created from pieces of multiple former districts, the information from whichever district 
contributed the largest to the new district was applied to the new district. Both of these 
situations are potentially problematic. I ended up deciding to drop many of these districts 
from this analysis, since in initial analysis they often showed sex ratios becoming more 
imbalanced, when I expected them to be less imbalanced. Dropping these from the 
analysis should not bias the results in any way, as I have no reason to think that these 
districts are different in terms of their son preference, fertility-decision making, access to 
sex-selective abortion, or child mortality rates and differentials. Dropping them reduces 









Almost 25% of districts in India showed signs of equalization in their child sex ratio in 
2011, although the national child sex ratio became more imbalanced. This analysis looks 
in depth at the districts that showed signs of equalization by decomposing the 
equalization into fertility and mortality related change and exploring that by rural/urban 
status and by geographic clusters. 
 
Overall, both the contribution from excess mortality and pre-birth events fell between 
2001 and 2011, but the relative contribution (percent of each) stayed roughly the same. 
Pre-birth events make up the vast majority of the cause of imbalanced sex ratios in both 
time periods. There were no major differences in the decomposition between the four 
main clusters of equalization around the country (north, west, south, and northeast). 
While much of the equalization seemed centered around urban centers, in the majority of 
the districts that showed equalization, the equalization was happening in both rural and 
urban areas. When rural and urban child sex ratios were decomposed, the magnitude of 
the contribution from pre-birth events decreased over time in both rural and urban areas, 
however, the contribution from excess girl child mortality increased in urban areas, while 
it decreased in rural areas. This suggests that stagnation or increases in child mortality 
might be occurring in urban areas more than rural ones.  
 
The equalization in child sex ratios are due to both reductions in pre-birth events and 
improvements in girl child mortality relative to boys, and there is no evidence in 2011 of 
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a relationship between improvements in mortality and percent of imbalance due to pre-
birth events (a tradeoff).  Pre-birth events still make up the majority of the cause of 
missing girls, therefore, efforts to restrict access to sex-selective technology are still 
essential, as are efforts to improve people’s view of the value of girls throughout their life 
course, thereby reducing the desire for sex-selective abortions and excess girl-child 
mortality.  
 
This analysis has shed light on the pattern and composition of the 153 districts that 
showed equalization in child sex ratios between 2001 and 2011. The equalization in these 
districts (the 106 with full data) resulted in an estimated >280,000 girls being alive in 
2011 who would have not been had the child sex ratio not equalized (remained at the 
2001 level, taking population growth into account). This is an astounding number of 
saved lives. While we do not yet know if the equalization seen will be sustained over 
time, these findings have helped us understand this new phenomenon, which has today 






Table 3.1: The Child Sex Ratio in 2001 and 2011 in districts that showed equalization, 
official and estimated mean ratios and mean change 
  Mean Range 
Official Rates Child Sex Ratio 2001 879 766 to 979 
Child Sex Ratio 2011 900 790 to 982 
Change in Child Sex 
Ratio 
21.8 1 to 87 
Rates calculated 
using available data 
Child Sex Ratio 2001, 
ages 0-4 
879 761 to 989 
Child Sex Ratio 2011, 
ages 0-6 
902 798 to 985 
Change in Child Sex 
Ratio 




Table 3.2: Number of districts per state in each analysis 









TOTAL 153 123 106 
Andaman and 
Nicobar 
2 0 0 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
6 6 0 
Assam 7 5 4 
Bihar 12 7 8 
Chhattisgarh 1 0 0 
Chandigarh 1 1 0 
Delhi 3 3 0 
Gujarat 12 12 12 
Haryana 16 15 15 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
6 5 5 
Jharkhand 3 2 0 
Karnataka 11 10 11 
Kerala 4 4 4 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1 1 1 
Maharashtra 4 4 4 
Manipur 2 0 0 
Meghalaya 3 3 0 
Mizoram 6 4 0 
Nagaland 3 2 0 
Orissa 3 3 3 
Pondicherry 2 0 0 
Punjab 20 17 19 
Rajasthan 1 1 1 
Tamil Nadu 18 14 16 
Tripura 2 2 0 
Uttarakhand 1 1 0 






Table 3.3: District-Level Survival Ratios for 2001 and 2011  
 Mean Range 
District-Level Survival Ratio 2001, Males 0.937 0.874 to 0.987 
District-Level Survival Ratio 2001, Females 0.929 0.867 to 0.995 
District-Level Survival Ratio 2011, Males 0.952 0.908 to 0.994 





Table 3.4: Decomposition of sex ratio into pre-birth events and child mortality, 2001 and 
2011  
 Mean Range 
Contribution To Child Sex Ratio From Child 
Mortality, 2001 
7.2 -14 to 33 
Contribution To Child Sex Ratio From Pre-Birth 
Events, 2001 
113.6 16 to 236 
Contribution To Child Sex Ratio From Child 
Mortality, 2011 
4.18 -16 to 29 
Contribution To Child Sex Ratio From Pre-Birth 
Events, 2011 
93.1 4 to 200 
Difference In Child Mortality Contribution Between 
2001 And 2011 
-3.0 -32 to 26 
Difference In Pre-Birth Events Contribution Between 
2001 And 2011 





Table 3.5: Percent of missing girls due to pre-birth event and excess mortality  
 Mean Percent Range 
Percent Of Missing Girls Because Of Pre-Birth 
Events, 2001 
93.7 %  46% to 141% 
Percent Of Missing Girls Because Of Excess 
Mortality, 2001 
6.3%  -41% to 53% 
Percent Of Missing Girls Because Of Pre-Birth 
Events, 2011 
92.5% 10% to 153% 
Percent Of Missing Girls Because Of Excess 
Mortality, 2011 
7.5% -53% to 89% 
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Table 3.6: Child Sex Ratios by Rural and Urban Status, 2001 and 2011  




Child Sex Ratio, 2001 893 (759 to 1017)  882 (755 to 1080) 
Child Sex Ratio, 2011 910 (716 to1004) 909 (793 to 1128) 




Table 3.7: Rural/Urban decomposition of sex ratio into pre-birth event and child 
mortality, 2001 and 2011  








 Contribution To Child Sex Ratio 
From Child Mortality 
Contribution To Child Sex Ratio 
From Pre-Birth Events 
2001 17.2 (-75, 111) -1.5 (-32, 102) 110.7 (27, 230) 129.1 (-3, 256) 
2011 11.8 (-37, 74) 3.48 (-31, 110) 91.4 (0, 197) 99.4 (21, 206) 





Table 3.8: Mean child sex ratio, percent contribution from mortality and pre-birth events 
by cluster  












































*North=all districts with equalization in Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan 
*West=all districts with equalization in Gujarat except Navsari 
*South= all districts with equalization in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and 




Table 3.9: Regression output of the percent of the imbalance in child sex ratio due to pre-
birth events on the level of male and female child mortality in 2001 and 2011.  
 
Regression Equation (estimated separately for 2001 and 2011):  
 
Percent of the child sex ratio due to pre-birth events (2001) =C + B1x(Quartile of male child 
mortality(2001)) + B2x(Quartile of female child mortality(2001)) + B3x(child sex ratio(2001)) + 
error 
 
 2001 2011 
Male Child Mortality Quartile 4.25** -0.55 
Female Child Mortality Quartile -6.49*** -2.21 
Child Sex Ratio 0.029 -0.02 
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CHAPTER 4  
PAPER 3:  
WHY ARE SEX RATIOS BEGINNING TO EVEN OUT IN INDIA? 




“There is an expression in India that  
‘bringing up a daughter is like watering a neighbor’s plant’”  








Evidence from the most recent India census suggests that despite a country-level 
downward trend in child sex ratios (fewer girls than boys), the states and districts that 
have in the past had the most imbalanced sex ratios are beginning to show evidence of 
slowing of decline and even turn-around.  This paper explores possible demand- and 
supply-side factors that could influence son preference and sex-selective behavior. The 
marriage market, labor market, and social norms are explored as possible demand-side 
factors, and supply-side factors relating to availability of medical professionals are 
explored, at varying individual-, community-, and state-levels. A lower community level 
child sex ratio (fewer girls compared to boys) is not associated with an individual woman 
having a lower odds of having a boy. When more women were in advanced labor 
opportunities in the community and more women had access to doctors and nurses, there 
was a lower odds of having a boy. Community level labor market was also associated 
with the overall community level child sex. These findings suggest that community 
factors relating to supply and demand of boys compared to girls may be influencing 
decision-making.  More research on possible mechanisms for equalization in sex ratios is 
necessary, particularly using data sources that allow for integration of other district-level 





The most recent Indian census (2011) showed the child sex ratios (the number of girls 
under age five divided by the number of boys under age five) are more imbalanced to 
disadvantage girls than in recorded history (Registrar General of India, 2011). However, 
recent analysis by Diamond-Smith and Bishai (2013) found evidence that child sex ratios 
in the districts of India that have previously had the most imbalanced sex ratios were 
beginning to equalize, even though child sex ratios in the country as a whole worsened 
(Diamond-Smith and Bishai, 2013). This suggests that in districts with a long history of 
increasingly imbalanced sex ratios, some type of feedback mechanism is at play that is 
changing behavior so people are discriminating less against female children.  
 
The initial analysis by Diamond-Smith and Bishai used data from 1981-2011 to look at 
the state-level, and found that this reversal was visible in the states and territories of 
Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, and to some extent Gujarat (Diamond-Smith and 
Bishai, 2012).  Using fixed effects models, they found evidence of this trend at a district-
level throughout the country as a whole over this time period (Diamond-Smith and 
Bishai, 2013). Diamond-Smith and Bishai’s analysis used census data, so all correlations 
were at a population level. Therefore, while the trends are suggestive of district-level 
trends affecting individual behavior, population level analysis cannot make strong claims 
of this relationship at an individual-level.  
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If indeed some type of correction mechanism is starting to occur in Indian districts with 
very imbalanced sex ratios, it is important to explore potential drivers of this reversal. 
The results of Diamond-Smith and Bishai (2013) suggest that the quantity of sex-
selective abortions might be decreasing, because the sex ratio is falling. It is also possible 
that excess female mortality is declining because people are providing better care for 
their girls. There are a number of factors that could be leading to these changes, both 
from the supply- and the demand-side. In this paper I will look at those that can be 
measured in the National Family Health Survey of India, round 3 (NFHS-3). These data 
were collected from a representative sample of households in India in 2005-2006.  
 
Possible drivers of equalization in the child sex ratio include tensions in the marriage 
market, which would make having a male child less attractive; improvements in women’s 
opportunities in the labor market, which would make having a female child more 
attractive; the success of certain government programs and laws that have been enacted to 
improve the status of girls and restrict sex selection; among others. On the supply-side, I 
explore access to sex-selective technology, which could be decreasing due to increased 
government regulation. On the demand-side, I explore tensions in the marriage market, 
opportunities in the labor market and social norms, as factors that would make people 








There is a plethora of evidence in India for a demand for sons (Pande and Astone, 2007, 
Diamond-Smith et al., 2008, Arnold et al., 1998, Clark, 2000, Dyson and Moore, 1983). 
Historically, child sex ratios in India have been slightly imbalanced because people 
practiced female infanticide (Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997, Dyson and Moore, 1983). 
However, in the mid 1980s, when ultrasound technology and abortions became widely 
available in India, there was a method for people to act on their son preference more 
easily (supply increased to meet demand), and sex ratios became increasingly imbalanced 
(Das Gupta and Bhat, 1997).  
In this paper, I conceptualize the situation of son preference and sex ratios in India in 
terms of a market. This is a useful way of understanding this phenomenon because it 
allows us to see how different development might affect the sex ratio in a population. For 
example, as family planning access expanded, the “price” of controlling fertility declined. 
As access to abortion and sex-selective technology then expanded, the price of selecting a 
son also dropped.  
Market explanations can be visualized on a supply and demand curve (see below). When 
the demand curve shifts right, the price goes up, the quantity goes down. When the 
demand curve shirts left, the price goes down and the quantity goes down. When the 
supply curve shifts right the price goes down and the quantity goes up, and when the 
supply curve shifts left, the price goes up and the quantity goes down.  
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Fig 4.1: Supply and Demand Curve  
In this framework, we can think about the various ways that the supply or demand curve 
might shift. Access to technology or regulation of technology might shift the supply 
curve right or left. Changes in education level, social contagion, complementarity of the 
good to other up trending goods, substitutability of the good to other down-trending 
goods or norm changes might shift the demand curve left or right (among other 
possibilities).  
Before ultrasounds and sex-selective abortion, the cost (emotional, societal) of removing 
an unwanted female fetus was high, so very few people would use that/demand that, so 
the quantity was low, and sex ratios at birth were only slightly imbalanced. However, 
with an increased supply of sex-selective technology, the cost of having a son was lower 
(less emotional burden, less social stigma, however, an added financial cost). This shifted 
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the supply-side right. Therefore, the number of sex-selective abortions increased as 
supply met demand, and the sex ratio became more imbalanced.  
 
The finding by Diamond-Smith and Bishai (2013) that child sex ratios are increasing in 
some states could suggest that the quantity of sex-selective abortions is decreasing. This 
could be due to a left shift in demand, or a left shift in supply. There are a number of 
factors that could be leading to this change, both from the supply- and the demand-side.  
 
i. Demand Shifts 
 
Demand-side shifts in this situation are centered on a parental utility function, where 
parents derive utility from children based on both their quality and quantity, and often 
have to make a tradeoff between the two. 
U(Quality, Quantity) 
In the Indian setting, I propose four main factors affecting child quality. The first is social 
status enhancement of children, which can be accomplished through the child marrying 
up, excelling in school or their career, etc. Second, quality rests in old age support, for 
example, the ability of the child to work in the household or on a family farm, or the child 
to migrate and send remittances to the parents. Old age support can be either or both 
financial or emotional. A third measure of quality might be the child’s own happiness and 
health, which would bring the parents happiness. The fourth measure of quality can be 
through the children providing their parents with grandchildren, thereby maintaining the 
family and the genetic line.  
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In India, the ability for a child to be of high quality can be determined by factors in the 
marriage market, such as marriage squeezes, which will either allow or prohibit children 
from marrying up or producing grandchildren. Educational or labor opportunities can 
affect a child’s ability to succeed in their career, and be able to provide monetary old age 
support. Discrimination against girls entering the labor force, or the decline of such 
discrimination can also affect the potential quality.  
ii. Supply Shifts 
There are three ways that people can have more boys (increase their odds of having a 
boy), all of which have become more effective in recent decades. The first is to become 
pregnant again if the desired number of boys has not been achieved, or to stop having 
children if the family has enough boys. Family planning options have made this easier 
than historically. Second, if a woman is already pregnant, she can choose to not abort a 
boy fetus (or abort a girl fetus and then become pregnant again more quickly with a boy). 
Access to ultrasounds has made this option more realistic. Finally, if a boy has already 
been born, a family can work harder to keep him alive, and immunization, better 
nutrition, and the child survival revolution in general have made this step more effective 
than before.  
In this paper I will look at those that can be measured in the NFHS-3 data. On the supply-
side, it is possible that access to sex-selective technology could be decreasing, perhaps 
due to increased government regulation. On the demand-side, it is possible that people 
are desiring fewer sons, and therefore seeking fewer sex-selective abortions. Or, people 
might be demanding more daughters, so once people have a child, they provide equal 
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quality care to girl and boy children. These changing preferences could be due to 
changing social norms, changes in the marriage market, the labor market, or some other 
factors affecting behavior.  
 
II. Demand-side Factors 
 
i. Marriage market  
 
It is safe to assume that most people in India wish to marry someone of the opposite 
gender, which implies that in the population as a whole it would be beneficial to have an 
equal number of girls and boys (sex ratios here being seen as a public good). Most 
societies, including India, often have an age gap between the bride and groom, with the 
groom being slightly older. In these cases, as long as the population is still growing, even 
if there are uneven sex ratios, each man will be able to find a wife, because he can seek a 
wife in the larger pool of women in the cohort below him. In most of India, despite 
fertility decline, the population is still growing due to population momentum (Bhaskar, 
2011).  
 
India (and China) are at the cusp of a huge problem due to uneven sex ratios in their 
marriage markets as their population pyramids begin to even out. Previously, because of 
population growth, the size of the cohort below any given cohort was larger, however, in 
China today and in India in the coming decades, it is predicted that the cohort sizes will 
have the opposite trend, with larger cohorts above, and smaller cohorts below (see Fig 2). 
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Projections by Guilmoto (2012) suggest that there will be as many as 40 million men 
remaining single between 2020-2080 in India, and 32 million in China in that same time 
period (Guilmoto, 2012).  These projections assume that most women will want to marry, 
however, if India and China follow the trend in other countries during development, and a 
sub-population of women begin to opt out of marriage, there will be even more bachelors.  
 
 
Fig 4.2. Population pyramids of India and China in 2000 and 2050 (Lewis Historial 
Society, 2012) 
 
It is possible that such large numbers of unmarried men will lead families to revise their 
preferences for sons. If families derive benefit not just from having a son, but from 
having a grandchild (via a married son), then there might be an increased utility of having 
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a daughter. Additionally, not only do married sons provide benefit because they can 
produce grandchildren, but they may also provide benefit through the additional support 
that a daughter-in-law provides. For example, evidence from China suggests that not only 
do sons send money back to support parents in old-age, but daughter-in-laws also 
contribute a significant proportion of their income to their husband’s parents 
(Bhattacharjya et al., 2008). Therefore, it is possible that an unmarried son could be less 
valuable if he cannot marry, and parents, and when faced with the option of having a son 
who might never marry or a daughter who would marry, the family might not prefer the 
son. For this to be true, parents would have to value having a grandchild above other 
possible child quality related factors. 
 
Another possibility is that as women become a scarce resource they will be able to 
compete more on the marriage market, and either demand higher quality husbands, which 
might have some long-term benefits to parents of daughters, or be required to pay a lower 
dowry, because men are so desperate for wives that they will not demand as high of a 
dowry. There has been debate in the literature as to what uneven sex ratios and squeezes 
in the marriage market will do to dowry.  An economic perspective suggests that dowries 
should fall with increasingly imbalanced sex ratios, however, Bhaskar (2011) has shown 
that as long as social disparities widen, dowry prices should rise (Bhaskar, 2011). Dowry 
is the bride’s family’s opportunity to move upwards, so it can be seen as the cost of a 
higher-class groom. Therefore, even in a situation with an excess of men, dowries may 
rise because families still must compete for high-class grooms. Recently dowries have 
been increasing in India, even in regions that historically did not have a tradition of 
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dowry. Some have even suggested that the declining position of women in India is due to 
the marriage squeeze, as states that previously relied on bride price (the grooms family 
paying the bride’s family) have now switched to dowry (Bhat and Halli, 1999). 
 
While the concept of a marriage market is easy to understand, actually measuring the 
marriage market is more complex. Part of the problem with measuring the marriage 
market in a place like India, which has a growing population, and a tradition of men 
being older than their wives, is that even if in a given age group there are more men than 
women, if men marry younger wives, the pressures on the marriage market will remain 
low. Other factors that complicate the measurement of the marriage market in India is the 
tradition of exogamous marriage, which makes defining the potential pool of marriage 
partners difficult. Some literature has suggested that using larger measures of the 
marriage market (such as district or state) can help account for marriage migration and 
provide a reasonable measure of the marriage market (Caldwell et al., 1983).  
 
In theory, when there is a shortage of women in an age group, men will reach farther 
down into younger age groups to find wives. Therefore, one way of measuring pressures 
on the marriage market could be through the size of the age gap between husbands and 
wives. In theory, the more stressed the marriage market is, the larger the marriage gap 
would be.  Edlund (1996) showed how son preference increases the age gap in marriage, 
and how the lowest ranking males will have the largest age gap in marriage (in other 
words, a sign of a low-quality marriage is a large age gap) (Edlund, 1999). Cross 
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sectional data suggest that where there is an excess of men, the marriage gap is bigger 
(Edlund, 1999).    
 
Tucker and Van Hook (2013) proposed a method for projecting the marriage market in 
China using data on the sex ratio at birth, the rate of growth, the marriage age gap, and 
the life expectancy of men and women to the average age at marriage (Tucker and Van 
Hook, 2013). This model is based purely on demographic information, but provides 
valuable information about the magnitude of marriage market imbalance in different 
future population growth or son preference regimes.  
 
ii. Labor Market  
 
When there is a shortage of women it is possible that the lack of sufficient workers to fill 
occupations where women have higher productivity could change the value of women. 
This mechanism can only work through occupations that exclude men (in other words, 
occupations that men can/will not fill when there are not enough women around, even if 
the wage is high). In this case, labor markets would have to compete more for the smaller 
pool of women, and therefore wages would rise. If female wages rose faster than male 
wages, then a family deciding whether to have a boy or a girl might see the potential 
earnings of a daughter being higher than the earnings were before, and therefore wish to 
have a daughter. Of course, this would only act in the short run, because if everyone 




Past research has suggested that in regions of India that are dominated by rice cultivation, 
instead of wheat, female survival is enhanced (Kishor, 1993). This is thought to be 
because women are more productive in rice fields than in wheat fields, therefore their 
economic value is higher. This argument has been used to help explain some of the 
historical trend of lower son preference in the South (rice producing) states of India. 
Research by Qian (2008) in China found that holding male income constant, female 
survival increases when female wages rise, and vice versa (female survival declines when 
male wages rise, holding female wages constant) (Qian, 2008).  
 
There is mixed evidence about the role of women’s wages and labor force participation 
on sex ratios or other measures of gender preference in India. Cross-sectional data have 
found that in states where more women work sex ratios are less imbalanced (less 
disadvantageous for women) (Kishor, 1993). However, others have pointed out that 
because of the practice of exogamous marriages, the labor market in a specific 
community should not have much impact on gender preferences or differentials (Foster 
and Rosenzweig, 2001, Drèze and Sen, 1998). Sophisticated models that take into 
account marriage migration have suggested that when the destination of marriage 
migration is to areas where technology changes favor opportunities for women, there is 
relative preference for girls and improvement in female survival (Foster and Rosenzweig, 
2001).   
 
The labor market is changing in India, with an increase in jobs in the global technology 
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sector. There is evidence that returns to middle and upper schooling for women have 
increased in the past few decades (although they have not improved for primary 
schooling) (Duraisamy, 2002). An interesting experiment in New Delhi found more 
discrimination based on caste than on gender in the hiring market (Banerjee et al., 2008). 
This suggests that labor market opportunities for women in India may be opening up due 
to reductions in discrimination against women in general.  
 
iii. Social Norms 
 
It is also possible that sex ratios are equalizing because social norms about preferences 
for boys or girls are changing. There is no clear evidence as to why norms about gender 
would be changing now in India, since efforts have been made for many decades by 
NGOs and the government to improve the status of women. Chung and Das Gupta (2007) 
have suggested that changes in social norms were responsible for much of the decline in 
son preference in South Korea, however, why and how social norms changed is not 
clearly understood (Chung and Das Gupta, 2007). A myriad of programs and schemes 
have been instituted by the Government of India and various NGOs and other interested 
organizations across the country, aiming to reduce discrimination against females. It is 
possible that these programs and schemes have influenced people’s views and led to 
changes in behavior. For example, many states have used conditional cash transfer 
programs to improve the status of girls, whereby if the family complied with a certain 
aim (birth registration, immunization, registration in school, or delaying age of marriage), 
they would receive a financial incentives (Sekher, 2010). Some of these schemes are 
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supported by the central government, while others either are eventually taken over by 
states, or initiated by states. Some schemes target the whole state, while others only 
specific groups, such as those in backwards classes or in the lowest wealth quintiles. 
Many of the schemes have met with problems in implementation, lack of central/state 
support and too many restrictions and criteria for membership (Sekher, 2012). A recent 
report by the National Advisory Council of India stated (p. 7) “There is no field-based 
impact-assessment of these schemes, in the absence of which there is no evidence 
regarding the desired objective of reducing sex selection. Clearly, there is a need for a 
systematic evaluation before these schemes are articulated or promoted as the center-
piece of the fight against the declining sex ratio” (Naqvi and Kumar, 2012).   
 
Past research looking at social norms and son preference in India found that religion and 
caste were associated with son preference, but other measures of social norms, such as 
territorial and kinship endogamy, were not associated (Pande and Astone, 2007).  There 
are pervasive differences between religious groups in India, with Muslims generally 
having higher son preference, having higher fertility, and being less likely to use 
contraception than Hindus (Clark, 2000, Pande and Astone, 2007, Dharmalingam and 
Morgan, 2004). There are also regional variations in factors related to religion, for 
example, in some states Muslims and Hindus are equally likely to practice purdah (a 
certain set of behaviors revolving around women being restricted in their movement), 
while in other parts of the country Muslims are much more likely to practice purdah than 
Hindus (Rahman and Rao, 2004). However, this does not necessarily equate to women’s 
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decision-making power, as this same study found Muslim women generally have more 
decision-making power than Hindu women (Rahman and Rao, 2004).  
 
Analysis of panel data in India found that an individual’s exposure to cable TV was 
associated with a decrease in the acceptability of son preference, in addition to decrease 
in the acceptability of violence against women (Jensen and Oster, 2009). This suggests 
that exposure to modern ideas can change people’s norms, which can perhaps in turn 
impact behavior.  I was unable to find any papers that looked at the role of community-
level norms on son preference or sex ratios in India, but research on other related topics 
has found that, for example, community-level opinions about the importance of 
delivering in a facility (the percent of the community who thinks delivering in a facility is 
important) is related to an individual’s probability of facility based delivery (Moyer and 
Mustafa, 2013). The theory is that women will be influenced by the views of the 
community around them—these are the norms they are subjected to and which affect 
their behavior.  
 
III. Supply-side Factors 
 
There has been a proliferation of mobile ultrasound clinics, which offer (and even 
advertise aggressively) a relatively inexpensive way of finding the sex of a fetus 
(Retherford and Roy, 2003). Once the sex has been determined, people have little trouble 
obtaining an abortion (not explicitly for sex selection, but for another reason). Since sex-
selective abortion is technically illegal in India since 1994 (although abortion itself has 
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been legal since the 1970s), there are very few data about exactly how accessible sex-
selective abortions are throughout India (Naqvi and Kumar, 2012). Since direct evidence 
about availability of sex-selective technology is limited, one way to estimate the supply 
of sex-selective services could be by using the number of clinics or physicians in a 
community as a proxy. Since sex-selective abortion is illegal, it might be hypothesized 
that most sex-selective abortions happen in non-formal settings, however, there is 
evidence of strong sex preference among physicians (stronger even than in the 
community as a whole), suggesting that physicians might be willing to facilitate or turn a 
blind eye to sex determination and sex-selective abortions in their clinics (Patel et al., 
2013).  
 
Conceptual and Analytical Frameworks 
 
We conceptualize a woman/family’s decision-making along the process shown below in 
Fig 4.3. After a woman becomes pregnant, she and her family can decide whether to test 
for the sex of the fetus. If they do not test, they can either have an abortion, the baby can 
die spontaneously, or they can have the baby.  If they decide to test for the sex, they can 
either find out it’s a boy or a girl. At this point, regardless of the sex, they can decide to 
have the baby, they baby can die spontaneously, or they can have an abortion. In the 
NFSH-3 data, we are able to only measure babies that are born.   
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Fig. 4.3: Conceptual framework 
 
We hypothesize that the various community and individual level factors described above 
influence all stages of this decision making process: from the decision to get pregnant all 
the way to deciding whether to keep a child of a certain sex or not. The analytical 
framework below shows how we conceptualize these various factors influencing each 
other, and how they fit into the two different sets of models (Fig 4.4). We hypothesize 
that the community level factors are associated with the community level child sex ratio, 
which we model in Model 2. We hypothesize that both individual and community level 




Fig 4.4: Analytical framework  
 
Specifically, we hypothesize that a marriage market that had too many boys in it would 
make people desire a boy less. We hypothesize that larger age gaps between spouses 
indicate a marriage market that is less favorable for boys, and which would make families 
desire a son less. Either the average community level age gap, or the couple’s own age 
gap might influence this. In terms of the labor market, we hypothesize that where more 
women are in the labor force, especially in more advanced occupations, families might 
see daughters as having more earning potential or more potential to increase their social 
standing through a good job, and therefore desire a son less (this could be either 
individual labor or community level patterns). Relating to access to providers at ANC or 
delivery, we hypothesize that in communities where women have more access to 
providers (either at ANC or delivery) or individual women used these services, women 
would have more access to a sex selective abortion. Finally, communities were social 
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norms are more favorable to daughters or less favorable to sex selective abortion, as 
measured by acceptability of wife beating and access to modern thoughts via TV (which 
presumably are more gender equitable), we hypothesize would be associated with an 
individual having a lower probability of having a son (these factors could either act at the 
individual or community level).  
 
 




This analysis uses data from the National Family Health Survey of India, round 3 
(NFHS-3), which was carried out in 2005-06 (International Institute for Population 
Sciences (IIPS) and Macro International, 2007). It collected data from individual women 
and households in a representative sample around the country. The number of women 
sampled was based on the size of the state, with some adjustments to take HIV 
prevalence into account (to sample enough women to obtain data on HIV, which was 
collected in Round 3 for the first time). Sampling was conducted differently for urban 
and rural areas, and respondents were sampled based on the population of rural and urban 
areas in each state.   In the rural sample, villages (Primary Sample Units, or PSUs) were 
selected with probability proportional to size sample (PPS) is the first stage of sampling. 
Within each PSU, households were randomly selected (second stage). In urban areas, 
three-stage sampling was used, where wards were selected using PPS first, and then 
census enumeration blocks were randomly selected, and then within that, households 
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were randomly selected (International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and Macro 
International). 
 
The 2001 Census was used as a sampling frame. Stratification of villages was based on 
geographic area. Villages were then stratified based on village size, percent of males in 
non-agricultural sector, percent of population of scheduled caste or tribe, and female 
literacy. Also, since NFHS-3 collected HIV data, high, medium and low HIV prevalence 
was also used to stratify (International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and Macro 
International).  
 
For this analysis, I use data from the women’s questionnaire. Women were eligible if 
they were 15-49. NFHS-3 did not publish which district households were living in (due to 
the HIV data collection), therefore it is not possible to connect these data to other surveys 
or census data at a district-level. The survey did identify households by “stratum” that 
was based on geographic areas, and therefore this is used as a proxy for “community” in 
the creation of community-level variables.   
 
All women who were sterilized more than 2 years before the survey data were collected 
are removed from the analysis because they were not at risk of having a child (the main 
outcome of interest in the analysis). I assume that all of the non-sterilized women were at 
risk of having a child, even if she was using family planning at the time of data 
collection. For the purpose of this analysis, the sex ratio is calculated as the number of 
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girls/the number of boys, so a lower value means there are fewer girls, unless otherwise 




The first model looks at the impact of various demand-side, supply-side, and 
demographic variables, on the probability that a woman who had a child in 2005/2006 
had a boy, rather than a girl (among women who had a child in those years).  
 
Model 1:  
Probability(B|had a birth in 2006)= C+ B1(Stratum-level Child Sex Ratio) + 
B2(Women’s demographic factors) + B3(Stratum-level norm factors) + B4(Stratum-level 
marriage factors) + B5(State-level marriage factors) + B6(Stratum-level labor factors) + 
B7(Stratum-level Supply factors) + e 
 
The second model looks at whether the stratum sex ratio of children under 10 was 
influenced by the stratum- and state-level demand- and supply-side factors.  
 
Model 2: 
Stratum-level sex ratio =C+ B1(Stratum-level marriage factors) + B2(State-level 




The first model is run using multivariate logistic regression, and the second multivariate 
linear regression. All models are weighted using svy, and Model 1 is clustered at the 
stratum-level and Model 2 at the state-level (since the outcome of interest was at the 
stratum-level). Models are run in a step-wise fashion, where first the bivariate model is 
run, and then the demographic variables, and various community-level variables (relating 
to marriage market, labor market, social norms, and access) are each added individually, 
and then all variables are modeled together.  
 
i. Demographic variables 
 
Woman’s age, education, religion (Hindu/other), whether she is currently using family 
planning, and the household wealth index are included as demographic variables in all 
models. Additionally, the number of boys and the number of girls in the household are 
included as measures of parity. Other variables relating to demographics are also 
included, but they are discussed more below as they relate specifically to the marriage 
market, labor market, norms, and supply of services.   
 
ii. Marriage market data and variables 
 
The first way that marriage market is measured is by the age gap between the husbands 
and wives in the analysis.  The age gap between husbands and wives is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the wife at time of marriage from the age of the husband at time of 
marriage using the NFHS-3 data (since some husbands may have died I use the gap at 
 119 
time of marriage). A stratum specific average age gap is also calculated by averaging the 
age gaps in each stratum.  
 
iii. Labor market data and variables 
 
The first set of variables used to measure labor market are based on the NFHS-3 data on 
women’s reported occupations at an individual-level. A variable for any labor force 
participation and participation in high-level occupations (where the categories of 
professionals, clerical and sales were coded as higher-level occupations) are included. A 
stratum-level variable for percent of women in the labor force at and a variable to 
measure the percent of women in a stratum in higher-level occupations are both created. 
 
iv. Norm data and variables 
 
Three different variables are included in the analysis to measure community-level norms 
that might be related to changing sex ratios. The NFHS-3 included questions about 
women’s ideal number of girls and boys. Both an individual and community-level 
(stratum) variable is created that measures the ratio of the average ideal number of boys 
over the average ideal number of girls. In this case, a higher value means more boys are 
desired than girls. Jensen and Oster (2009) found that women increasing the amount of 
TV they watched over time was correlated with a decrease in women’s son preference, 
and in their belief that it is alright for a husband to beat his wife (Jensen and Oster, 2009). 
Therefore, I include a variable from the NFHS-3 for TV watching, where “more than 
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once a week” and “at least once a week” was coded as “Frequent TV watching.” This is 
an individual-level variable. Finally, five questions in the NFHS-3 were asked about the 
acceptability of wife beating under various circumstances. I combined these into a score, 
where a higher score meant that the respondent said wife beating was acceptable under 
more circumstances.  This is then made into a community-level mean score and also 
included as an individual-level variable.  
 
v. Supply-side data variables 
 
Due to lack of data about access to sex-selective technology specifically, I use percent of 
women per stratum who deliver with a doctor or a nurse, and the percent of women who 
see a doctor or nurse for their Antenatal Care (ANC), as a proxies for access to sex-
selective technology. This variable is used to estimate the availability of access to modern 
technology and providers in a stratum.  These variables are also included at the 
individual-level, and all come from the NFHS-3 data.  
 
IV. Robustness Tests 
 
i. Poisson  
We re-ran model 1 as a Poisson model. Since the outcome, an individual having a boy in 
2005-06) is a count, it is possible that a Poisson model would be a more appropriate 





Since some of the variables differed significantly between the datasets with and without 
the missing cases which were dropped due to missingness of some variables (namely, 
women’s education, age gap between husbands and wives, and ideal number of boy over 





I. Description of the data 
 
There were 84,609 women in the 2005-2006 NFHS-3, and 65.5% of them (55,447 
women) were not sterilized 2 years before the start of the survey. These women live in 73 
strata, which I took as a proxy for “community.” Stratum range in size from 169 women 
to 5,031 women. Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of all women in the sample 
compared to those who were not sterilized 2 years before the survey and those cases for 
which there was complete data. The average age of women in the full sample is 33 years, 
and in the restricted sample it is 31 years old. They have 5.04 and 5.52 mean years of 
school, and 42.13% of all women, compared to 38.15% of the restricted sample of 
women, were participating in the labor force at the time of the survey. A larger 
percentage of the women in the restricted sample gave birth to a boy in the 2 years before 
the survey (11.83% compared to 7.75% of the full sample). The largest difference 
between the two samples is in family planning use, which makes sense since the 
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restricted sample was created by removing all women who were sterilized 2 years before 
the study. 
 
Stratum- and state-level factors differ little between the two groups. The average stratum-
level child sex ratio for children under 10 in 2003 is about 0.70 (ranging from 0.41-1.07). 
All marriage sex ratios are in the reverse measurement (boys/girls).  The stratum 
estimated marriage sex ratio using the NFHS-3 method is 1.09-1.10 (ranging from 0.74-
1.29). The average percent of women in the labor force per stratum is 42 and 41% 
ranging from 18.69-84.27%), while the percent of women in advanced sectors of the 
labor force is lower at 6.99 and 7.19% (ranging from 1.17-28.76%). 
 
In terms of norms, the stratum mean ideal number of boys over girls is the same in the 
two groups, with both groups wanting slightly more boys than girls. Acceptability of wife 
beating is low, with a mean stratum score of about 1.2 (where a low score represents less 
acceptability), and the mean stratum percent of frequent TV watchers was about 60%. 
The non-sterilized women watch TV on average slightly less frequently, and they have 
slightly lower scores on the acceptability of wife beating scale.  
 
For the supply-side variables, about 34% of women on average per stratum in both 
samples saw a doctor or nurse for their ANC visits, with this being slightly higher for the 
smaller sample. Fewer women (about 24% on average per stratum) delivered with a 
doctor or nurse, and this was slightly lower for the smaller, non-sterilized sample.  
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There were about 2,748 women who had missing values for one of three variables: 
women’s education, age gap between husbands and wives, and ideal number of boys over 
girls. When comparing the full non-sterilized sample to the non-sterilized complete 
sample (no missing data), we can see that these two groups had statistically significantly 
differed values for some variables. Namely, when women with missing values were 
removed, the sample was significantly older, poorer, less Hindu, higher stratum level 
ideal number of boys/girls, less frequent TV watching, fewer women in the labor force, 
more women seeing a doctor or nurse for both ANC and delivering (p<0.05). 
Additionally, an individual being in the labor force, using family planning and 
acceptability of wife beating were marginally significantly higher (p<0.1).   
 
II. Model 1: Probability of having a boy, given a woman gave birth in 2005-06 
 
In the bivariate model testing the impact of the stratum-level child sex ratio for children 
under 10 in 2003 on an individual’s probability of having a boy, there was no significant 
relationship (model 1A, Table 4.2). When demographic variables were added to the 
model (model 1B), using family planning, having a ratio of ideal number boys over girls 
that favored more boys, having more boys already in the household or fewer girls already 
in the household were significantly associated with the odds of having a boy (p<0.001). 
The main predictor (stratum-level child sex ratio) was still not associated. Neither the 
community-level marriage nor labor variables were significantly associated when they 
were added separately (models 1C and 1D). When the stratum-level norm variables were 
added (model 1E), a higher the stratum-percent of frequent TV watching was associated 
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with and increased odds of having a boy (p<0.05). Both of the stratum-level access to 
provider variables were associated with the outcome (1F): access to a provider for ANC 
decreased the odds of having a boy, and access to provider for delivery increased the 
odds (p<0.001).  
 
In the full model (1G) with all variables included, the higher the stratum-level child sex 
ratio for children under 10 in 2003 the greater the odds of having a boy (p<0.1). This 
would suggest that when the child sex ratio is lower (fewer girls), women have a greater 
probability of having a girl. A woman using family planning, having a ratio of ideal 
number boys over girls that favored more boys, having more boys already in the 
household, fewer girls already in the household, a lower stratum-level percent of women 
in advanced labor opportunities, lower stratum-level percent of women who saw a 
provider for ANC and a higher percent of women who delivered with a doctor/nurse were 
associated with increased odds of having a boy (p<0.05). 
 
III. Model 2: Stratum sex ratio in children under 10 in 2006 
 
The second set of models looks at the predictors of the stratum-level sex ratio in children 
under 10 in 2006 (Table 4.3). The higher the stratum percent of women in professional 
occupations, the higher the stratum sex ratio (less imbalanced) (p<0.01).  Stratum age gap, 
norm variables and the supply of doctors and nurses, as measured by the stratum percent of 
women who saw a doctor/nurse for the ANC or delivery, were not associated with the 
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stratum-level child sex ratio. Additionally, a lower percent of Hindus at the stratum level 
was associated with a higher stratum child sex ratio.  
 
IV. Robustness Checks:  
 
i. Poisson Model 
 
We re-ran the bivariate 1A and full model 1G as a Poisson model 1J and 1K (Table 4.4). 
As can be seen, there was little difference in the significance of the variables between the 
logistic and the Poisson models, although the magnitude of some of the coefficients 
changed marginally. therefore, we are confident that we are not gaining any additional 
information by using the logistic model. Additionally, since we are modeling all women 
who had a birth in 2006 in this analysis, and roughly half of them had a boy, although this 
is event data or count data, it is not rare, and Poisson models are generally more 




When we imputed the missing values for education, mean ideal number of boys over girls 
and age gap between husbands and wives, and re-ran the model as model J (Table 4.5), 
the main predictor was no longer even marginally associated with the odds of having a 
boy. None of the other variables changed their relationship with the outcome of interest 





In the bivariate model for the relationship between the stratum-level child sex ratio for 
children under 10 in 2003 and an individual woman’s odds of having a boy were not 
associated. Nor were they associated when demographic factors, or stratum-level factors 
relating to the marriage market, labor market, social norms or access to providers were 
added to the models separately. Use of family planning, ideal number of boys over girls, 
and the number of girls and boys in the household were robustly associated with a 
woman’s probability of having a boy. We would expect that families with a higher ideal 
number of boys compared to girls to have more boys, as we find in this analysis. The 
number of boys in a household was associated with increased odds of having a boy, while 
the number of boys in the household was associated with decreased odds. It appears that 
these variables might be picking up on a family’s preference for boys compared to girls—
families with many boys want more boys and are more likely to have another boy, 
whereas families with more girls have less son preference and therefore are less likely to 
use sex selection to select for a boy.  
 
A greater percent of women in advanced labor in the stratum is associated with a lower 
probability of having a boy. Also the higher the percent of women in the stratum who 
watched TV frequently, the higher the odds of an individual having a boy, however, this 
lost significance in the full model. Past research suggested that TV watching was 
associated with less son preference, the opposite of what was found here. Perhaps in this 
case TV is enforcing gender norms and preferences.  
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When only access related factors were added, a higher stratum percent of women who 
saw a doctor or nurse for ANC reduced the odds of having a boy, while a higher stratum 
percent of women who saw a doctor or nurse for delivery increased the odds of having a 
boy, and this remained true in the full model. Perhaps in communities where more 
women see highly trained providers for ANC, they are less likely to get information 
about the sex of their fetus in the ultrasound than in communities where more women see 
less-well trained/non-professional providers. It is also possible that communities with less 
son preference or sex-selective abortion are also communities with more use of or access 
to highly trained providers—we do not know the causality in this relationship. It is 
surprising that the two access variables seemed to act in opposite directions, as we would 
expect them to act in the same direction. It is important to note that the individual 
measures of these two factors were not associated, which suggests that it is not actually 
an individual woman’s access to providers that is associated with the probability of 
having a boy, but instead the community level access. This suggests that there is 
something about communities in which more women see providers or there is more 
access to providers for ANC that is also associated gender preference or the ability to act 
on that preference.  
 
The second set of models looking at the predictors of the stratum-level sex ratio in 
children under 10 in 2006 found that in stratum with more women in high professional 
degrees, the sex ratio is less imbalanced (more girls). Perhaps women in communities 
where more women have good occupations see more value in having daughters, whereas 
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any type of labor force opportunity does not have the same effect.  There is some 
evidence that strata that have a higher percent of Hindus have lower sex ratios (more 
imbalanced, suggesting more son preference), as has been found in other literature 
(Clark, 2000). Interestingly, the supply of doctors and nurses, as measured by the stratum 
percent of women who saw a doctor/nurse for the ANC or delivery is not associated with 




This analysis is limited by the fact that the NFHS-3 does not provide code to link 
individual women, primary sampling units, or stratum to districts in India, so I am not 
able to merge in any district-level information on labor market (such as wages or 
occupational structure) or the marriage market (such as the marriage sex ratio of each 
district as a whole). District-level data might have been strongly correlated with 
outcomes, especially since many states in India are incredibly large, populous, and 
diverse. It would have been especially useful to be able to link the NFHS-3 data to 
districts in order to look specifically at districts that were identified as experiencing 
equalization in the 2011 census, and see what mechanisms were at play. Other ways of 
measuring supply of sex-selective technology, either through merging in more data on 
health care availability from other sources, or data on laws restricting sex determination 
and their implementation, would have been useful.   
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I am also limited in my ability to create community/norm variables that might be 
associated with changes in preference for boys out of the NFHS data. The same is true for 
variables measuring the supply of sex-selective technology or access to medical care and 
health facilities. This is partly due to few questions about these topics in the NFHS-3 and 
partly due to lack of previous research identifying what types of community-level norms 
that might be important to consider.  
 
Finally, I am not able to include any data on changes in dowry price or practices that 
could be important factors, nor am I able to include any variables about programs, laws, 
education campaigns etc., that might have been influencing behavior. Part of this is due 
to the issues discussed above about lack of precise geographical information about where 
the sample was drawn from, but also due to poor data on programs, laws, and schemes 





This analysis does not find evidence that the community level child sex ratio lagged to 
2003 is associated with an individual; woman’s probably of having a child of a certain 
sex in 2006. Unsurprisingly, people’s preferences for boys compared to boys, and they 
gender make0up of the children already in their household influence decision-making. 
More women participating in higher level jobs in a community appears to be associated 
with a lower odds of an individual woman having a boy and the overall community level 
child sex ratio, suggesting that community level labor force opportunities may be 
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influencing gender composition decision making at both an individual and community 
level. Finally, access to providers at the community level also appears to be associated 
with the sex of child an individual woman has, although the direction and mechanism of 
this relationship is not clear. More research should focus on labor force and supply side 
variables for understanding changing patterns of sex preference.  
 
More research is needed on factors associated with changing sex ratios to understand 
what is occurring now, what might occur in the future, and ideally to determine if there 
are effective ways to encourage communities or individuals to prefer girls more, rather 
than waiting for all districts to reach very imbalanced levels of child sex ratios before 
beginning to equalize. This analysis provides initial evidence that looking at community-
level factors is important in understanding these trends. The incorporation of other 
datasets and types of variables will be key to understanding what other demand- and 
supply-side factors might be associated with changes in sex ratios. This paper provides 
some possible paths to explore further, particularly relating to marriage age gaps, 
women’s labor force participation (notably women in higher level, professional 




Table 4.1: Difference between main variables of interest in full NFHS-3 sample and 
sample used in the analysis 
  A: Full 
Sample 
(N=84,609) 




with full data 
(N=10,006) 
Individual level Factors Mean (range) 
or % (N) 
Mean (range) 
or % (N) 
Mean (range) 
or % (N) 












 Average age gap 






5.29   
(-22 – 67) 
(ND) 




1.22   
(0-6) 
1.23 
 (0 -6) (ND) 















 (0-8) (ND) 
 In the labor force 42.13 % 
(35,645) 
29.8 %  
(3,812) 
30.8 %  
(3,085)* 
 Wealth Index 3.41  
(1-5) 




 Percent of women 
using family planning 













Community level factors (Stratum)   
 Stratum mean ideal 
number of boys/ideal 







 Stratum mean 
percent of women 








 Stratum mean score 








 Stratum-level child 









 Stratum percent of 










 Stratum percent of 
women in higher level 






8.15%   
(1.17-28.76%) 
(ND) 
 Stratum percent who 








 Stratum percent who 
delivered with a 







*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ND= No significant difference; for difference between 
columns B and C 
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Table 4.2: Individual Model: An individual woman’s odds of having a boy in 2006, 












































Woman’s age  1.006*  
[1.731] 






















    0.921 
[-0.604] 
Wealth Index  1.043* 
[1.926] 






    1.254*** 
[4.459] 
Ideal number 
boys over girls 
 1.397*** 
[7.215] 
    1.393*** 
[7.080] 





    0.291*** 
[-8.566] 





    4.049*** 
[8.420] 
Hindu  0.986 
[-0.310] 
    0.986 
[-0.284] 
State  1.004* 
[1.808] 
    1.002 
[0.783] 
Age Gap  0.999 
[-0.256] 
























  0.983 
[-1.088] 





   0.913 
[-1.023] 
  1.217 
[1.504] 







Mean Beat Wife 
Score  






Boys Over Girls 





of Frequent TV 
watching 





































Observations 12,789 10,005 12,789 12,789 12,789 12,789 10,005 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust t-statistics in brackets 
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Table 4.3: Community Model: Factors associated with the stratum-level sex ratio in 
children under 10 in 2006 
 A: Stratum Sex Ratio 
Under 10 in 2006 
Stratum Average Age Gap Between Husband and Wife 0.027 
[1.460] 
Stratum Average Wealth Index -0.070 
[-1.121] 
Stratum Percent of Women in Labor Force -0.139 
[-1.085] 
Stratum Percent of Women in Advanced Labor 0.920*** 
[2.927] 
Stratum Mean Acceptability of Beating Wife Score -0.006 
[-0.233] 
Stratum Mean Ideal Boys Over Girls 0.036 
[0.144] 
Stratum Percent Watch TV Frequently 0.026 
[0.139] 
State Dummy 0.004** 
[2.342] 
Stratum Percent Hindu -0.152** 
[-2.450] 
Stratum Percent ANC with Doctor/Nurse -0.059 
[-0.229] 











Table 4.4: Model 1: Poisson model of an individual woman’s odds of having a boy in 
2006 given that she had a child 







I: Full Model 
Poisson 
Stratum level sex ratio in children 
































































































































Observations 12,789 10,005 12,789 10,005 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust t-statistics in brackets 
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Table 4.5: Model J with imputed missing values for women’s education, ideal number of 
boys/girls and age gap between husband’s and wives.  
  G: Full Model  J: Full Model 
with imputations 








Women’s education single years /Imputed Women’s 


































































































Observations 10,005 12,789 
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EQUALIZING CHILD SEX RATIOS IN INDIA:  




The three papers that make up this dissertation explore various aspects of the emerging 
trend of child sex ratios beginning to equalize in some districts of India, despite a national 
downward trend. The dissertation starts with a wide lens, looking at the pattern of child 
sex ratios in all districts in India in the last four censuses (paper 1), then focuses in on the 
districts that have shown equalization (paper 2) and finally narrows to explore individual 
level behaviors related to this trend (paper 3).  The first paper tests whether there is 
district-level evidence for the relationship between extremely imbalanced child sex ratios 
in one census and the rate of change in child sex ratios 10 years later using data from 
1981-2011. I find evidence in support of this hypothesis, even after controlling for other 
demographic factors such as fertility, infant mortality, rural/urban status, caste, and 
female and male literacy rates. This suggests that something occurs when child sex ratios 
become very imbalanced that causes changes in behavior that lead to less imbalanced 
child sex ratios in the future. In other words—some corrective forces appear to come into 
play.  
 
The second paper then focuses in detail on the districts that have shown signs of 
equalization between 2001 and 2011, decomposing the equalization into fertility and 
mortality related change. This is important for understanding the mechanisms through 
which child sex ratios are equalizing. I then explore the decomposition by rural/urban 
areas and geographic clusters of equalization. The contribution from both pre-birth events 
and excess female child mortality has declined between 2001 and 2011, and the relative 
contribution from each has remained stable. The simultaneous and proportionate 
reduction in both pre-birth and post-birth processes that distort the sex ratio is all the 
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more remarkable because the phenomenon occurs in both rural and urban areas and it 
occurs all over India. I suggest demand and supply mechanisms that would explain why 
dynamic changes in female fetus abortion and female child mortality rates could be tied 
together. 
 
 Geographic epicenters of equalization emerge. Two of these clusters of equalization are 
in the north (most of Punjab and Haryana) and west (in Gujarat), where child sex ratios 
had dropped to extremely imbalanced levels and now are rebounding. The other two 
clusters are in the south (mostly in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka), and the northeastern 
states, where child sex ratios have not fallen to such extreme lows, and yet have 
rebounded slightly. There were no substantial differences in the contribution to the 
imbalanced sex ratios or equalization from pre-birth events versus mortality between the 
different clusters, even though their baseline child sex ratios were very different. The 
contiguous nature of the equalizing districts suggest that socially contagious forces that 
drive changing demand for girls and changing supply of medical technology may be a 
factor in the trend. Some of the clusters of districts are centered around major urban 
settings, providing some evidence that this trend is initiating in urban centers, as we 
would expect from past literature on social and demographic trends in India. However, 
this is not the driving force as there are clusters of equalization that are not centered 
around urban centers, and there are many urban centers (for example Mumbai or 
Lucknow) that have shown no evidence of equalization. 
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In the districts that have shown equalization, it is predominantly occurring in both rural 
and urban populations. Of the few where it is not in both rural and urban populations, it is 
mostly in urban areas. There were no substantial differences in the contribution to the 
child sex ratio from pre-birth events and mortality between rural and urban areas in either 
2001 or 2011, except for urban mortality. In 2001, child mortality contributed positively 
to the child sex ratio in urban areas (meaning that it was a corrective force on imbalanced 
sex ratios at birth), however, in 2011 child mortality was a negative contributor. This 
suggests that female mortality advantage relative to males has stagnated or even declined 
in urban areas. More research is needed to understand why mortality for female children 
in urban areas might have increased relative to male child mortality.  
 
The majority (about 93-4%) of the contribution to imbalanced sex ratios comes from pre-
birth events, and this is also where the majority of the balance is occurring. Assuming 
that pre-birth events are primarily sex-selective abortion (as is supported by much 
previous literature in India), this suggests that families are either actively choosing not to 
abort female fetuses, or restrictions on the supply of sex-selective technology have 
improved. If the equalization had been due primarily to improved girl child mortality, we 
might have interpreted the phenomenon as an expected trend with development because 
reductions in child mortality should favor girls over boys as child mortality becomes 
more dominated by congenital and gestational problems (Hill and Upchurch, 1995). 
However, this is not the case—something is actively happening to make girls less 
disadvantaged before they are conceived or born. Since pre-birth events (most likely sex-
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selective abortions) still make up the majority of missing girls, efforts to discourage the 
desire for and restrict access to sex-selective technology should not be abandoned.   
 
The decomposition also suggests that girls still lag behind boys in mortality rates, and 
efforts to reduce child mortality still need to target girls, most especially in urban areas. 
Past evidence is mixed about whether the girls born in areas with more sex-selective 
abortion are more desired, and therefore have better outcomes, or not (Hu and Schlosser, 
2010, Hu and Schlosser, 2012). Ram et al. (2013) found that female under-five mortality 
was more than 25% higher than male under-five mortality in almost half of districts (Ram 
et al., 2013). Findings are also mixed about gender disparities in stunting or under 
nutrition in India, although socio-economic factors (such as birth order, parents 
education, etc.) have been found to be correlated with stunting in females, but not in 
males (Mondal et al., 2012, Biswas and Bose, 2010, Subramanyam et al., 2010, Bharati et 
al., 2009).  
 
If indeed people are beginning to prefer girls more or boys less, and extremely 
imbalanced sex ratios are linked to equalization in child sex ratio in the future, it is 
important to consider potential drivers. In other words, what happens with child sex ratios 
becomes very imbalanced that makes people have more girls? In the final paper I test 
various demand and supply factors on the probability of having a boy and community 
level sex ratios. Marriage market, social norm and supply side variables do not seem to 
be associated with either an individual woman’s’ probability of having a boy or 
community level child sex ratios. However, it appears that women’s labor force 
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opportunities, especially more participant in professional occupations, both at an 
individual- and community-level, are associated with child sex outcomes and child sex 
ratios.  
 
Much more work is needed in this area, because understanding the drivers of equalizing 
sex ratios could help policy makers understand where and when sex ratios might begin to 
equalize elsewhere, and also help policy makers to spur on equalization of sex ratios by 
targeting factors which are found to most influence people’s behavior. For example, if 
improved labor opportunities cause families to see improved value of having a girl, 
programs to expand such occupational opportunities for women in areas with imbalanced 
sex ratios could help slow and reverse the trend.  
 
Only a few potential drivers of equalization were explored in this analysis (labor, 
marriage, norms and supply), and there are many other potential social trends that might 
alter people’s perceived value of their daughters, such as care giving in old age, and boys 
labor and earning potential over time. Interviews with parents in India found that people 
are realizing that daughters actually care more for their parents in old age than sons 
(Kaur, 2013). Some experts in India believe that the combination of poor marriage 
prospects, lack of labor force opportunities, and an increase in illegal drug use by young 
men in Punjab was causing families to prefer daughters over sons (Kaur, 2013). These 
types of potential drivers deserve much more attention. The lack of data on the efficacy 
of programs and policies aimed to improve the status of girls through various means 
(ranging from media and educational to incentive based) and lack of data on the efficacy 
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of laws restricting access to sex-selective techniques severely limits our understanding of 
whether such programs, policies or laws are worth continuing or expanding in the future.   
 
Child sex ratios have only begun equalizing between 2001 and 2011 in a minority of 
districts (<25%). We do not yet know if this trend will be sustained over time in these 
districts, and if it will spread to other districts in India. Since the next Indian census 
(2021) is many years away, finding ways to continue to watch this emerging trend using 
other data sources is key. The Sample Registration System, collected annually, will be a 
useful place to start. Additionally, confirming this trend in other data sets (including 
household level) would help validate the findings in this analysis. The National Family 
Health Survey (the fourth round of which is coming out very soon) and the Indian 
District Level Household Survey would be ideal for such validation and continued 
monitoring of these trends, especially relating to individual decision-making. Aside from 
large household surveys and censuses, qualitative work in the areas that have shown signs 
of equalization in child sex ratios on whether people are consciously aware of being 
impacted by very imbalanced child sex ratios and are therefore actively changing their 
behaviors would help us better understand this phenomenon.  Such qualitative work 
could elucidate other important factors influencing individual decision making, such as 
those discussed above (old age care and opportunities for sons).  
 
The fact that some districts have begun to show equalization should not be interpreted as 
an opportunity for the international or Indian communities to pay less attention to child 
sex ratios in India with the notion that child sex ratios are starting and will continue to 
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“fix themselves.” Even if there is some inflection point at which child sex ratios rebound 
and begin to equalize, sitting aside and letting sex ratios fall to extremely low levels 
would cost the lives of many millions of girls, especially since we do not know the rate at 
which sex ratios would fall and then rebound. Furthermore, at this point we only have 
evidence of small levels of equalization, and we do not yet know if child sex ratios will 
rise to parity, or simply level off at some less imbalanced, but still uneven, ratio. 
 
A variety of programs and interventions have been implemented in India to try to 
equalize the child sex ratio, however there is very little evidence as to whether these 
programs have had any effect. Table 5.1 lists some of the programs and interventions that 
have been implemented in India, and other potential types of programs or interventions 
that might be successful given the findings of this research, all of which require a sturdy 
evidence base.  
 
In summary, the problem of imbalanced child sex ratios in India has not been solved.  
More efforts are needed to improve the value of girls so that families provide girls the 
same resources as boys once they are born, and families perceive equal benefits to having 
a boy and a girl and therefore do not opt for sex-selective abortion. Alongside working to 
improve the perceived value of girls, efforts to reduce access to sex-selective technology 
are key, while ensuring that women still have access to abortion. Many millions more 
girls are aborted or die before the age of 5 than boys in India. Despite increased 
discrimination against girls at a national level, pockets of districts in India are starting to 
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equalize their child sex ratios. This dissertation sheds light on this new phenomenon, and 
gives us hope that this positive trend will continue in India in the years to come.  
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Table 5.1: Sample of implemented and potential programs and interventions aimed to 
equalize the child sex ratio in India (see Hameed et al. 2011 for a more comprehensive 
review) (Hameed, 2011) 
Program/Intervention Implemented to date? 
Conditional cash transfer program 
where parents receive financial 
incentive for having a girl who is 
unmarried by age 18 
Yes: Apna Beti Apna Bai, through the Integrated 
Child Development Scheme program of Haryana 
Govt. (Department of Women and Child 
Development)  
Media campaigns with Bollywood 
Stars  
Yes: Mandira Bedi (Bollywood star) with the 
Laadli Campaign 
School Vouchers for girls  Yes: example: The School Choice campaign in 
Delhi  
Latrines in schools to halt the drop 
out of girls 
Yes: The Rural Development Ministry has 
launched the School Sanitation and Hygiene 
Programme  
Conditional cash incentives for 
registration of a girl child 
Yes: The Dhanalaskhmi Scheme gives parents 
cash to help pay for the birth of a girl child upon 
birth registration, implemented in 7 states 
General Electric role out of new 
ultrasound technology 
No: GE will role out new mobile ultrasound 
technology, this is an opportunity to have better 
enforcement of laws to restrict sex determination 
Girl wage top-ups No: this could increase wages for girls relative to 
boys, which might be effective given the findings 
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